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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Purpose of the Thesis 
---,~~~.
The purpose of this paper is to report on the results 
of reseafch ~f the United States Office of Censorship from 
the birth of that office in 194-1 to its timely death in 1945, 
Jim Heath, in his article, "Domestic America during 
World War II: RfJsearch Opportunities for Historians," 1 pro-
vided the impetus for the rese~u:'ch that has resulted in thh: 
paper~ Profe~sso!' Heath sta·tes that rnost histories of World 
"' 1·1· h ·: . " 'h I ' . t' t ••ar .... ave r2 ... eg;;;:teo. ·~; e .. :mer1.can oomes ·J.c scene .o a 
secondary plaee .Ln the process of reporting on the more 
') 
exciting d:i.plo1:1at.ic &md military aspects o:f the period,'· He 
suggests that historians analyze the various published 
histories of' the many short.,lived bureaucratic offices 
necossitated by the contingencies of World Viar II. One of 
these offices v1as the U~ S~ Office of Ce11sorship. 
In repox·ting on thfJ aetivi ties of the Office of 
Gcnson:hip -this paper will diBeuss the goverTm;ent program;; 
1Jim F~ HeE~th~ t~Domes·tic America during World War II: 
Resc.;n·ch Opnortuni.ties for Historians," The Journal of 
!:EeE~h~:'!-E:.!l~-:.''o~Q.J:.:i, J,V III (September, 19'71)-, ~"j1l1.f"".::Lf11f:--·· 
1. 
l 
of compulsory and volunts.ry censorship, how they sometimes 
conflicted and overlapped, and how they stood up against 
military CE:nr~Ol'llhip. In chapter VI an appraisal will be 
2 
made of the censorship program and its Director, Byron Price. 
Problems and IJ.mi tations 
--·--··-'"~-"~--b-... ~--..·---~~---~·~-
1'he greatelJt problem encountered in researching the 
activities of the Of:fico of Censorship involved the avail·· 
ability of official United States Government records and 
documents, 'l'he official Records of the Office of Censorship 
-~--..~,<---· -----~··-·~-~----·-""~---"-...----=·........_· 
are desc:dbed in brief sLrmmary form in prcl]J!I::~l}§l.l'Y: __ IQ.Y:~Irt;_oq 
J1o_~_,2!!> published by the National A:cch:Lves,J The Nat:Lonal 
Archives x·eta:i.m,, the onJ.;</ copic's o:f these documents which 
collect.i.ve:ly G.mc.unt to more than fi\rc hundred cubic feet of 
inf'orm:;;.t:l.on, 'f'l1e vast majority of these documents is ei thG:r 
closed by Presidential Order or, in tho case of certain 
documents, available only to", • , those agencies of the 
Federal Government that have a legitimate interest i..n the 
information , . . " they conta.in. 1+ 'rhe Preliminary Inventory 
of thesE! records lists thirty .. onc separate files, reports, 
:i.ndexet; t rec:orclings, budget estimates, ledgers~ telet:ypes ~ 
books, memoranda, radio watch-logs, and oth(~I' mir;collaneous 
·_of .Q.~n<':?r9hi:e, 19Lf1-.4·.'?. ( 7 vols.), is available for study, 
and that one only at high cost,5 
There are, however, a numher of documents, or copies 
of documents, contained in the Defense Collection o:f the 
University of CaliJo:r-nia at Berkeley. 'l'hese include an 
.3 
official report on the Office Of Censorship, a collection of 
press releases by that office~ a:nd copJ .. c::-3 c:f the v.rartime 
- -- ------- -- --- ------ r:. 
censorship codeS:·.....- --,J!he sci docu.rnenl;n eompJ:··ise -the backbone- o-f 
this paper, 
There are only two secondary S 1JlJ.:t:'cc_;s .. Ghat deal 
directl;,r with the Office of Censorship, Yf!::'!:l22.D""?.L.i3..:P.~~9.~_7 
was written by Theodore 1". Koop, former Assi.st:imt Direetor 
of the Office o:f Censorshii', In hh: bc;ok, Koop provid("" an 
overall view of the duties and activities of the offi0e, but 
he ignore.s or glosses over much cri t1ci.~nn of tb-e voluntary 
censorship :program, Koop is critical, hovwvor, of the 
efforts of military censors, who often acted in direct con-
" 
.:;The cost of a negative microfilm copy of these sevE'n 
volumes (!WOO pager.;) is $1.fOO; Jane F. Smith, Acting Di!:eetor, 
Civil Archives Division of the Nation8l Archives <:mel Recm.ds 
Service, to writer, November 11., 197:\. 
6Historical Re:r!Orts on War AdminJ rstn,,tion, fL)l"?J?.gE:~ 
5!.!}~__:tlJt ... ~9~:£.:fJ~~~~~~:f_.,g~~~~..£.~E~t~~~E (Wa:=:hi:rtgton,- D,G~-~ U~ s. Gov·8:rn-
rtJ'"Y''i' T•r:tntJ.'nn Q+'·>···['"'8> ·l·o"JJ ";) "'t'e ,.,,'(>c•c• Y•Al,,,,,SC'S <>l'n ·['Ol'lld 
,_.. i. '· .• 1 C> .J..J,.,,__, ~ • 7 r. o J..l.. )~·'· ~~·''-'· ···'<~·"-'-· C·.•- ·-"' ......,_, Y • - < 
in a s:ir1gle volume under the ti tlc-~, U c S, C_iff'ice of CensoJ>· 
s bJl~!~_y· r.5: s ? ~B..~~~~-~l~~~--.-1::§"§ f Th 1 s v u runic;-~-r.s~·illi~r:·;::i~.~-a .. -:t:iTJI~~---·<:; :e 
conte:n.tc ~ Tf1e fJ..:f.'teen -c-ensorshi11 codes are n::_~i:H;~mblcd. in a 
single volurne by 'the University of' Cal:Lforn:lo. librco.rv tcl.'.dor 
the title, Un.i ted States Office of Censon:hi.J:,: lVJic_:(;'"'l.l::tncous 
l)-u'·) 1 't. ~" ·1: 1'. or1 s:·-(-11'iF'2-::To"l:}iiT···---.. 1L"l·:·l-;;--:-t·~~·'t·J ·L·e·· -·o--1~'·-c7'o ... n. ":-'t· .,-;·,~·:·,,c·;~·--J:·'"o·~~·-·:r l;··J, ·:;-· ......... I. • '--'·-· ~. •· • 7.., 4 ···7 -:..d.J a • ,>.~ ·~~ , , '-~-•. ,\ ~>.) •• . 1-. •• _ .. -, ... 
v·oTuDJe ..... rs-·1nacc'Li:i.~al .. 8arid LLJ .... axrangcd. 
' 1 
flict with the Office of Censorship, ~ti.n}e_Qgnsorsl~p~9.f 
Press and Radio, by Robert E. Summers, 8 is helpful because 
4 
it documents much of the criticism leveled by journalists on 
the Office of Censorship during the earl;y- months of the war. 
As stated above, the documents of the· O:Cfi.ceJ of 
- -
C_ensors)1i.p :form the backl;Jone of this paper. ~:hese documents 
provided a starting point from which certain persons, 
incidents, regl<lations, and concepts could be f'urtllfn' 
investigated, In addition to theseavailable documents and 
the two boolcs cited above, the next most productive sources 
of information were the many periodicals published during 
the w<~.r. It is in these periodicalf: that one finds the bvlk 
of cri t:i.cism toward compulsory and voluntal'Y censorship. 
The writer attempted to con:espond with a.s many 
f'ormer Censorship officials as couJd be located more than 
tvienty-five yea:r.s after the Office of Censorship cc;,ased to 
function, The number of responses to these inqv.ir:i.f:s was 
encouraging, 1'he quality of one particular response con-
tributecl immeasurably to the resflarch, Byron Price, the 
former Director of the Office of Censorship, later Assistant 
Secretary-General of' the United Nations (19LV(--:lC))!f), pro-
vided prompt, willing, and able assistance at his ov,n 
expense and on his own time. 
5 
The research strategy, then, involved studying govern·· 
ment documents, and a kind of reconnaissance patrol throvgh 
many secondary sources. The periodicals of the period pro-
vided the main arsenal of ammunition for the scattered 
attacks of critic ism on government censorship. 1'he corres-
pondence with Byron Price 2.nd the interviews w:i.th Norman 
Carlson and lVi.e lvin Jacobus were a si.gniL\.cant breakthrough 
in the blockaded lines of official information. 
The Office of Censorship fought World war II on a 
home-front battlefield that often extended beyond the shores 
of the United States and onto the high seas. 'rhe army 
enliGted by the Office of Censorship included both willing 
and reluctant roc•ldiers the members of the American press 
and r;o,cUo. The battles they fought always had two goalst 
the deJ'eat of the enemy and tho preservation of democratic 
freedoms. As was bound to happen, there were times when one 
goal had to be achieved at the expense of the other. The 
battles fought by this army in the war on words were some-
times small and sometimes la.rge. They were never dull, 
though there were times when some persons quefot:Loned the 
strategic value of some of the battles. This paper tells 
that story. 
II 
THE CALL TO ARMS 
Formation of the Office of Censorship 
On the morning of December '?, 19Li·l, Japan attacked 
the United- States at Pearl Harbor. Just one hour after th<~ 
Sunday morning attack the United States began censoring all 
telegraph, cable, and radiotelephone messages between Hawaii 
and the United States. Within a week Army censors were 
opening letters that passed to and from the United Str;.ter; 
and tl'1e H.8}Naiial'.l Islands e t 
The ability of tho United Sta.t~3s GoverrmJent to aet H.s 
quickly as it did in censorship operations came as a result 
of planning for wartime censorship that went back more than 
two years. As early as September, 1939, the U. S. Navy was 
formulating plans for censorship operations. :Sy August, 
19Li·1, the U. S. Army was conducting a censorship education 
program for a small number of its of.'ficers. ~~he personnel 
trained by these two military branches were able to begin 
nominal censorship of postal and cable cormnunica tions 
crossing the borders of the United States soon after the 
6 
1 
Japanese aerial attacl1: on Pearl Harbor, 2 On December 8, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked J, Edgar Hoover, 
Director of' the Federal Bureau of' Investigation, to take 
temporary charge of' all phases of censorship.3 Thus, even 
before the Office of Censorship was born, military censors 
were conducting survc"illance of all types of communications 
to and from the United States. 
On December l8, 191H, Congress passed the First War 
7 
Powers Act which gave the President the power to conduct the 
censorship of all", .• mail, cable, radio, or other means 
of transmission passing between the United States and a:ny 
f . 4 . ore1.gn country: u 'I'his Act also declared that any p0r'::iOll 
convicted. of evading censorship wou.ld be subject to "ten 
years inrprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both. There were 
those who would, before censorshl:p ended i.n l9Lf5, suffer the 
full force of this penalty, Based upon the powel.'s granted 
him in the First War Powers Act, President Roosevelt, on 
December 1.9, issued an Executive Order formally establishing 
the Office of Censorshi.p.5 As Director of this office the 
President appointed Byron Price, formerly Executive Editor 
and General 1\lanagel" of the Associated Press. Price, born to 
farming pBTents in Indiana i.n 1891, had, after college, 
2r· . d 
. 01. • 
3r· · 1 _13~~ 9 p. 4. 
4Firut War Powers Act, Section 303, 55 Stat. 8J8, 
December 18, 194·1; quoted in ibid, 
5Executive Or<ler 8985, December 19, 191+1 ( 6FR6625). 
8 
become a correspondent for the Associate~ Press. By 1937 he 
had risen to the top position in that organization. 6 
Roosevelt's choice of Byron Price as the man who would soon 
be directing others to listen in on private telephone conver-
sations and read the mail of law-abiding, patriotic .American 
citizens was, as it turned out, a wise one. Journalists 
usually acquire an occupational distaste for any form of 
speec-h and the--
press are seldom more intensely recognized or supported than 
they are by .Ameriean newspapermen. To place as Director of 
Censorship another person, such as one who looked with favor 
oi1 censorship, could have created a totalitarian danger that 
the count17 could ill afford. Price himself reeogniz.ed that 
". • • no one wL.o does not dislilre censorship should ever b8 
permitted to exercise censorship."? 
Price's statemen·t was not mere rhetoric, for the 
Executive Order that created the Office of Censo:cship con-
ferred on the Director of that office "absolute discretion" 
. . . t' 8 J.n ceru;;or:t.ng communlca· 1ons. The Director of the Office of 
Censorship was enabled to wield semi-dict.a·i;o.r-iaJ. power,o;l he 
need answer only to the President of the United States. 
Such power and independence in a transistory cabinet 
position was unprecedented in American history. 
6
'l'heodore F, Koop, Weapon of Silence (Chicago: 
University of ChiC<1go Pres'8.;-T<Tii:"b),-·-pp:·1·7..::18. 
7Rer.2.E .. t:._2.!!-._!l}~_.9..::tfJ.c.~-- o:f__2_?E5>orshJJl., p. 1. 
SI, . 
.:...g.J.d,., P• 5· 
9 
~nst~ion of ~~e CensorshiP War M~£hine 
President Roosevelt directed Byron Price to oversee 
the compulsory censorship of international communications. 
Price was also asl~:ed to organize and supervise the censorship 
of the domestic American press and radio on a voluntary basis. 
·The government had decided that compulsory censorship of the 
___ pre::>s an_d J:';;td,io _V/ou.ld not be necessary as long as patriotic 
publishers and broadcasters were able to cooperate by with-
holding from print and the air any information that might 
hamper the Allied wax· effort. 
Price had to staff the central part of his censoring 
organization, begin reerui ting and t:r-a:i..n:i.ng ordinar·y citizens 
to work H.s censors (eventually replt~c:ing most- mil.i tary per .. -
smmel) , and com.·dinate alJ. of the nation's newEpaiJers and 
radio stations into a self-censoring unit. This meant eon-
tacting, organizing, an.d sv.pervising more than two thousand 
daily newspapers, eleven thousand weekly or ~1em1.-weekly 
papers, 925 radio stations, and thousands of scientific and 
technical journals. 9 In addition there were pul)lications 
from commercial, industrial, financ:.l.al, educational, 
religious, fraternal., and civic organis,ations that had to be 
constantly screened f'or infol'ilta'tion thB.t might be contrary to 
the war effort. Buildings had to be located to house 
regional censorship operations. Accounting and administra-
tive sections had to be set up. 1'housands of persons from 
all walks of life had to be trained as censors. 10 The 
majority of citizens employed by the Office of Censorship 
teachers, housewives, bankers, writers, businessmen, and 
linguists -- was put to work as postal censors in post 
offices across the United States, Women were believed to 
11 
make good postal censors. According to Melvin Jacobus, 
former District Postal Censor for San Francisco, there were 
more women than men available as postal censors simply 
because a greater number of men were serving i.n the armed 
forces, This also meant that the Office of Censorship was 
10 
able to choose from a larger group on the basis of intelli-
gence. Simply stated, there were more intelligent women than 
men available to fill positions as postal censors because the 
' 'l d f 12 men were :Ln 't ·1<:; a:cme _ orces overseaf:~-~ 
While the organization and constnJ.ction proce<:s was 
still only a few weel:s old, the Office of Censorship issued, 
on ,January 15, 1942, the first censorship codes for broad--
casters and publishers. 13 These two codes were the first 
10By February of 194~3, the high point of operations, 
the:c-e were 14,462 persons em~ployed. by the Office of' Censor-
ship; cited in ,!3_?J2..'2_l't_on th_~_J?_£f:i~.~-of Cens_2EshiE, p. 8. 
11Koop, .2_P_._ cit., pp. J4·-35·. Koop says that these 
women postal censors were' ". , • pa tJ.ent and would plod 
steadily through letter after letter .•• ," 
12Melvin Jacobus, interview, January 11, 1972. 
13u. S. Office o.f Censorship, Code of Wartime 
Practices for Am~:!'_).c.:<:~n,_l?!·oadc~?t~E?.• [Editfon:-'Ql'-:-Jimuar;y 12, 19~Dwashlngton, 15.C.: U. ~-;. Governm.cmt [Pnntlng Offlcej), 
[19l:f2J; and .Q._?d~of_l'larti.me PracticE~.s for ilJE_flme.ric_ll.n __ EY:.~e~s_§_, 
[Edltlon of January l5, 1942J \Vw.shlngton, D.C.g U.s. 
Government Printing Office), 1942. 
suggested guidelines for broadcasters and publishers under 
the program of voluntary censorship. Further discussion of 
voluntary censorship will be taken up l.n chapter IV. 
Censorship: ~:he Silenci n~s Service 
Before we begin looking at the programs of compulsory 
and voluntary censorship, itis worthwhile to include a brief 
-------pas-s-age -on --the- -Pl.lblic relations aspect of the Office of 
Censorship, In order for voluntary censorsh.ip to work effec-· 
tively in a country that boasts of its freedom of SJ:H3ech, a 
censoring agency needs, among other things, either a good 
pu.blic image, or no public image. It was impossible for the 
Office o:f Censor;;hip to function ent.i.rel;y' unknown to the 
public, although it tried very hard at times to stay in thro' 
background out of the purJJic eye. ~'he next best thing waH 
for the Office of Censorship to have a good or acceptable 
public image, and there. was a concentrated effort on the part 
of the Office of Censorship and the Office o:f Wm:· Information 
to build this desired image. 
Byron Price was quiclc: to admit that Americans would 
never like censorship: "No one need doubt where a eensor 
would wind up in a popularity contest," 14' In a letter to 
this writer Price stated that the Office of Censorship 
• • had no public relations staff' • , .. • 15 However, the 
--~·---·-·-·-· 
1L1. • Byron Prlce, quoted in Hobert E. Summers, Vlar.time 
CensorEhi:e of Press and Hadio (New York: }l, W. Wilson~·-··---··" 
Coffi150:i',y-, 191+2) , pp; 29.:J~·-·-
i5Byron Price to writer, NovmnhcT 8, 19?L 
12 
Office of War Information, headed by Elmer Davis, was the 
official public relations office for most government agencies, 
as well as being the propaganda office for the United States 
during the war. Indeed, these two agencies even managed to 
pool the public relations skills of its two Direc.tors in a 
s.wall booJ~: published at the height of the war for the sole 
purpose of explaining to the public the functions of the two 
------------- - ___ .. _/ 
offices. 10- -In tl1is book Price stated that ". • , the Office-
of' Censorship does not prepare or issu.e news . .,i7 However, 
one has only to read through the almost daily press releases 
published by the Office of Censorship in order to take a 
sk:eptica.l view of this statement. These press releases, many 
of which were textual copies of' addresses made by Price 
before various c5.vic and professiona:C. groups, were clearly 
designed to answer and quiet criticirsru of censorship and to 
drum up continued support for and compliance with voluntary 
. . . 18 
censorshi.p by the press, radJ.o, and the publlc. 
'6 1 
-Elmer Davis and Byron Price, War Information and 
Censorship (Washington, D .c,: American Comic~f"fon·-Publfc­
Affalrs);·"T194J]. 
17- . 
. ~::..~·, p. 66. 
18Director of the Office of Censorship, PR- 35, [Press 
Release No. 35] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Censorship, 
October 28, 1942),·p. 1. In this, a public radio broadcast, 
Price defined the related and cooperative functions of the 
Office of Censorship and tl'le Office of War Information. 
III 
COMPULSORY CENSORSHIP: 
THE FIRS~' LINE OF DEFENSE 
The survEdllance of all communications crossing the 
borders of the United States by radio, telephone, cable, or 
letter )1ad begun by December 13, 191H, This initial censor·~ 
ship effort was carried out by advance units of the Army and 
Nav~" When the newl;y-created Office of Censorship took. over 
these duties, it had a. functioning, though somewhat prim:i ti . vc' 
organization to build upon. 
Under the able leadership of Byron Price, the Office 
of Censorship began con.struct:ing the compulsory censorship 
codes that would regulate all radio, telephone, cable, and 
mail communications, All such communications would be read 
or examined before they were allowed to leave or enter the 
United States, The objective of this and all censorship was 
to insv.re that " . . • military information which might be of 
aid to the enemy be scrupulously wi"thhe.ld at the source." 1 
1Franklin D. Roosevelt, statement quoted in H.h;tori-
cal Reports on War Administration, A Report on the Office of 
f~2..;.;:..c:rsl1:iJ?, (Washington, D.c.: u. s .-Gov'8~rr1ment Yrrr~rrng··-·--­
Offlce, l';!q·)), p, 5; hereafter referred to as Heport on the 
.QJ fi .£5: ... 2E. c ?_lJg.~~.§ 11 i.l2 • ·-- ·-----~·--· 
13 
14 
'rhe first compulsory censorship codes to be issued 
were those for operating companies, cable and radio, and 
radiotelephone communications. 2 These three types of c·ommu-
nications were those that were most often utilizedfor the 
rapid transmission of international messages. It was neces-
sar:y to maintain stringent surveillance of these communi-
cations to insure that no information of value be tr~wsmi tted 
·to--the··-enemy~- --eithe-r --inten-tio:nally or inadvertently~ Those 
companies providing radiotelephone or cablegram services to 
businesses or individuals were required to submit all pro-
posed messages to a censor for clearance before the message 
was transmitted. Field censors were stationed in the oper"' 
ating rooms of' tl:wse companies. In most cases these local 
censors conld eva'.uate most messages in a very shol"t period 
of time. If neccE:sary, they could delay a proposed message 
until they sought advice from the Office of Ce.nsorsh:i.p in 
Washington. These cens'C>rs would, upon reviewing a proposed 
international message, ta!m one of eight typros of actions 
(1) PASS 
( 2) DELAY 
0 
2u, S: ?ffice of Censorship 1 Rules f~()J.:: __ Oper:_a.:ti.ne; 
Co~l!E§.~:.C_s, Edlt:ton of February 19 1 19Tt2 (Wash:tngton 1 D.C.x 
U. So Government Printing Office), 1942; hereaftE'r referred 
to as ~-ules for __ 9J2C0J.tj.:..I?.('.; __ gg_0Jl_~n;~!'~ ( 2-19··1>2) 1 U. S, Office 
of. C~nsorship I u •,_,0_:_ c~.:l2,Le_ .8.-!Jd l\ad~£. .. !:~_J].S0!:_l?_hiJ)_JZeKulation.~2· 
Ed:t t.1on of :February 19, 19£1·2 \ Waslnngton, D, C , : U, S. Govern-
ment Printing Office) , 1942; hereafter referred to as Cable 
and Radio Regulations ( 2-19--Li-2); and u, s. Office of ce!)s-ci'r-0 
s h 1 p , u ::-.§~~=J[i~~u:-§~~I~P( )2 Ol}_:!~.Q~.~ s () r:~ h i:eJ3~ll~1§,t ~£!:.:~. • Edition 
of February 1.9, 19<+2 WarJhlngton, D.C.: U, s. Government 
Printing Office), 1942; hereafter referred to as Radio-
telepholJ.0 .. Regt.t.!£1:.:0-on~ ( 2-19-42), -----
(3) PARAPHRASE 
(4) DELETE a part 
(.5) SUPPRESS 
( 6) CANCEL 
( 7) RETURN FOR CORRECnON 
( 8) I\EFER to Chief Cable Censor for his action or 
advice.3 
-- --A---la:cge --number of American businessGs utilized 
1.5 
radiotelephone and cable messages in conducting their normal 
business affairs. Few people, if any, felt these businesses 
would intentionally aid the enemy, but many did not realize 
how seemingly innocent messages could be of great value to 
the forces of Germany and Japan. Gel"man Uooboat commanders 
could, by intercepting these messages, study the names of 
ships and cargo J.ists to determine which ones would be 
carrying the more strategically important goods, and then lie 
in wait for these ships·. For this reason operating companies 
were prohibited from transmitting unauthorized coded call 
letters or special business signals that could possibly be 
utilized as a code. Even "fixed" or "canned" holiday 
greetings that could possibly be utilized as codes were 
h ''b't d 't• ' . 1 . . 4 pro ,J. '1 e wJ ,tou·c spec:La. pernusrnon. 
'l'hose persons or companies using cablegrams or tele~ 
granw between the United States and any foreign cov,ntry had 
3Ru1"'.ii_.fO,£__Q_p:_;_Eati_!}Z_Qomp,.;~)''lie~ ( 2-19-42), pp. 4-5. 
4Ibid. , p, 11. 
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to adhere to specific regulations. All telegrams (or cable-
grams, radiograms, etc.) had to contain the full name and 
address of both the sender and the addressee .5 This regu-
lation, while serving an important purpose, produced so:mc 
rather amusing incidents. One cable censor was mor8 than a 
bit surprised when he insisted that a cablegram from London 
fully identify the sender, who had merely signed his message 
------;;George-;-~~- In -cornp-J.iance with the censor' z 
following reply was promptly sent: 
PULL NA!'IIE IS GEORGE REX1 
ADDRESS, BUCKINGHAM PALACE. 6 
Cablegram regulations applied to everyone -- including the 
King of Englctnd, 
Anything umtained in a cable message that could 
_possibly serve as a code was prohibited. On August 31, 19LfJ, 
the U, s. Office of Censorship announced an Agreement between 
it and British Censorship to prohibl t cablegrams and radio." 
grams containing orders for flowers between the United Stgterc: 
and Europe, It was feared that anJrone, including enemy 
agents, might use a type of flower, the number of flowers, or 
their color to transmit coded messages, To protect against 
this poEJsi bili ty Bri tisli and American Censorship officials 
prohibited eab1egram and radiogram orders for flowers between 
their two countries in order to " • , prevent the use of 
5cl3:J:le __ _J!;)].!LB..adio Regulatior.ts. ( 2-19-42), p, 2. 
6
'I'heodore F'. Koop, Wea£011 of Silence (Chicago 1 
University of Chicago Press, --l9Tf'6), p .. ;-.. l)_s;-
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flowers as a medium of' private codes."? Cable users were 
also prohibited from making any reference to", •• location, 
identity, description, movement, or prospective movement of 
any merchant vessel, aircraft, naval or military vessel or 
naval or military force, including the collective or 
individual personnel thereof, operated by the United States 
or other nations opposing the Axis powers," 8 
Teiephone or ra-diotelephone corrnections crossing the 
borders of the United States were monitored by censors. The 
first radiotelephone code limited the languages of these 
calls to English, French, Spanish, and Portugul'>se, and lan·· 
guages other than English were allowed only when translators 
. ' 9 were a.vailable a·f; the censoring po~n·, .. Persons using inter~ 
national telephone service were prohibited from rncmtioni.ng 
merchant OJ~ mi.li tary shipping infonns.ti.on, from using any 
numbers or words that could be interpreted a.s codes, from 
criticizing the armed forces of the United States, or from 
say:i.:og anything that the censor, in his judgment, believed 
would", , , bring aid or comfort to the enemy ,.10 
A telGphone censor could immediately :interrupt or completely 
cutoff any telephone conversation he felt violated c.ensorsh:i.p 
--------· 
?Director of the Of:fice of Censor·ship, PR·~h9, [Press 
Release No, 1+9] (Washington, D.C,: U, s. Off'ice·-ar·censor-
ship), August Jl, 19lfJ; these press releases hereafter 
referred to as Cens.:?.E.ship pr:.,e_£:2.....!3::J.c;.§._~::., . .E,2,.:_ ___ , (date), 
8c~·:1?1c~_ll:.!l~..BadlQ_R<l,gu1a'j;io!l_::: (2-·19-Lt2), P• 5. 
9Ra .. s:Ll.<::~.:::l~:..ED..9J:<e R~2iclati.onE;_ ( 2~ 1.9·-1+2) , p, l. 
10Ib'd 2 .,:.._~~..:._ " f :p e ' 
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regulations. Cable and telephone censors were established 
throughout the United States and in other parts of the world. 
'£here were censorship stations in Honolulu, Brownsville, New 
York, Nogales, Seattle, Chicago, Tucson, Akron, Balboa, New 
Orleans, !Viiami, San Antonio, Los Angeles, San Juan, El Paso, 
Iceland, and various border points between the United States 
and Mexico •11 'rhe U, S, Office of Censorship also cooperated 
----------with -All-ie-d- c-e-nso-rship i-n- parts of 
information and personnel. 
The most important function of cable censorship may 
have been the protection of merchant ships, CenBors pro-" 
hi bi ted .all reference to ship movements in international com-
munications, 'l.'his effort, according to official sources, was 
", •• wholly successful. No instance o:f lOf''"' OJ:' damage to s. 
merch;,.nt verosel through int<-Jrception. of communications was 
reported throughout the entire war." 12 
Business firms, however, had to be able to carry on 
their OI)erations. These firms had to be able to notify their 
trading associates that shipments of goods would depart and 
arrive at certain ports at certain times. In order· to carry· 
on. these functions, business firms using cable or radio-
11K 't 2D ccl<;lp , E.Jl.....!o".~, , p • . 7 • 
12Rep_or~t~_s>!.!_ th...;,_Q£f..:iJ:s: .. ..2L~J1?..'?!.''?_12lE, pp. 28-29. 
The statement 1.s cautJ.ous.l;y made; J.f would have been unde-
sirable to attribute such losses to inadequate cE1.ble cen-
sorship. Winston Churchill. in The Second World War, Vol. V, 
qosj_~-th_:: _ _I5-ii!§ ( Boeton1 Houghtori.ll:i:f:Eim;-r9siT:·-pp. J-16, 
provJ.des data on Allied and U. s. merchant fleet losses, but 
he does not a ttr.i bute any J.osse s to faulty eensorship, 
:i 
" i 
r 
" " I 
I, 
': 
i 
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telephone communications were authorized to use any one of 
nine commercial codes in their messages, Each coded message 
ha.d to include a prearranged coded abbreviation or indicating 
symbol at tho beginning of each message to indicate to 
censors the authenticity of the message and the code being 
used, The nine commercial codes and indicating symbols 
authorized by the Office of Censorship were: 
Commercial Code 
---·---·~o---
ABC Sixth Edition Code 
ACME Commodity and Phrase 
Code and Supplement 
Bentley's Complete Phrase Code 
Bentley's Second Phrase Code 
Lombard General Code 
I.ombard Shipping Code and Appendix 
New Standard Halt Word Code 
New Standard 'l.'h:cG<c Letter Code 
Peterson's Third Edition 
- :1? 
] n di c ~ t ~£1JL__S J':ffi _9_'2.!. ~ .J 
ABC 
AC]I[!E 
BENCOM 
BEN SEC 
LOMGEN 
I,OJVlSHIP 
STANHAF' 
STANTER 
PET 
In addition certain banks and other businesses were allowed 
to use "test words" in interna.ti.onal communications. These 
test words usually appe~red as the first or last wonl in the 
text of a message and were used by these firms to insure the 
authenticity of their messages, 14 
Commercial codes and test words were necessary 
exceptions to censorship regulations prohibiting the use of 
private codes. The main'tenan0e of businGss aetivity was 
essential to the war effort and to the .American economy, 
l35L~P.:;.££~')2±1?..J:res~d~~.le9-..§.:01L12!..~.2• Js.nuary 20, 191+2; 
see also Davld Kahn, 1'he Codebreakers: l'he Storv of Secret 
Yf!j~ t~r:z. (New York: l'he.1iiac1i1i1lar1-c-om:Pany-;191i'lJ':-p;--5H>-:--· 
14_9el'}.~?rr-Jlip Pr-es,s .E_~~~ No.!. 39e, January 30, 19i+J, 
p. 12' 
Cable and radiotelephone censorship. lasted for the 
duration of the war. Ori January JO, 19i.fJ, censorship regu .. 
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lations covering cable, radio, and radiotelephone communi-
cations were combined in a single code. 15 The nature of com-
pulsor~' censorship is best described by quoting a sentence 
from this revised code: "All communications shall be sent, 
filed or transmitted at the sender's rlslc and may be con-
----
demned, suppressed, delayed, or otherwise dealt with at the -
d . i" f th 'tl t t' 16 1scre;1on o. e censor w1 1011 no 1ce," 
Compulsory censorship of internationalcommunications 
by cable, radio, or radiotelephone was rigidly fixed and 
enforced. 'l'he majority of the users of these types o:E inter-
ml"tional eommun).e:.a:tion dE,vices were bona fide ·businesses tho.t 
normally conducted their activitieB on an international scale. 
These busirHHJses, for the most part, read:lJ.y complied with 
censorship regulations and there islitt.le available evidence 
to support the existence of significant non-compliance or 
pro·test of the cable and radiotelephone n>gulations by these 
business firms. 
Some individuals did try to evade cable censorship 
without actus.lly trying to aid the enemy, One man in Pearl 
Harbor wanted to advise his friends in the United States that 
. 
15u. s, Office of Censorship, U~<-- S:_,S:_~~r;<l:£.~l?. . .ltt?.€':u-
latlons, Edition of' January JO, l9h·J \VIa:;hJ.ngton, D.C.: u. s. 
Gov.ernment Printing Office) , 1. 91-1-3; here<:dte:r. referred to as 
Cc~nsorsh~ . ..E~!:.t.la i:_:!:,~~ ( 1- 30-·I;+J) • This r<:JvisNl and combined 
code 1nclud.cd posta.i censorshlp regulations; post8J. censor-
ship is discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
16.[ .. d 2 :~.'?.:!:_•' p. ,, 
he was leaving Hawaii on a specific date and that he would 
arrive in the United States on another date, Cable censors 
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would not allow use of these dates because they obviously 
revealed the departure and arrival times of the ship on which 
the man would saiL This man then attempted to disguise the 
dates in his cablegram. He was caught and fined two hundred 
dollars for attempting to evade censorship. 17 
compliance as did cable censorship. Postal censorBhip was 
compulsory, it also touched upon the life of the ordinary 
citizen more than any other for·m of compulsory censorship. 
Protests of postal censorship were frequent. There were 
nu.merous incidents of non .. complianco, and attempts to evade 
postal censorship often resulted in severe penalties. The 
story of postal censorship is the subject of the next section 
of this chapter on compulsory censorship. 
The censoring of all mail entering or leaving the 
United States began within hours of the attack on I)earl 
Harbor. Army and Navy officers, previously trained as postal 
censors, handled this oper.·ation until the Of':fice of Censor-
ship wa:o equiJlped to asBwne direction of poHtal censorship. 
Compulsory censorship of comnnmi.cations crossing the 
border·s of the United States comprised ninety--nine percent of 
---·-----
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the work of the Office of Censorship. 18 Of this total, 
postal censorship required the greatest effort. More than 
one million letters per day passed through postal censorship 
stations and 
ten thousand 
required, at 
19 employees. 
the peak of operations, more than 
Obviously, postal censors did not 
read every letter that entered or left the country. Mail 
from servicemen overseas was checl>:ed by mill tary censors. 
Office of Censorship was, and still is, a secret. 20 EvEfn 
before envelopes were opened their destination and retux."11 
addresBes were checked against a "watch list." When one of 
these addresses was found on an envelope the letter was 
examined. FoB tal censors were ~Llso trained to spot hand-
wri·ting pecu1:tar:l.ties because enmny agents \Wing thEl mails 
could obviously change their addre:;;sos. 21 
The first postal censorship code was issued by the 
Office of Censorship in April of 19LJ-2. 22 Postal censorship 
regulations applied to all mail crossing the bordeJ~s of the 
United States. These regulations covered matter prohibited 
in international mail, mail to enemy :na:tionals in any country, 
--------~ 
18Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
'9 
.1. £1eport on the Of[is-~~-.2fS2.J1SO:S'?.fliJ2., p. 19, 
20~bid.' p. 21. 
21Ibid. 
· ~ 2u. S. ?f!:ice of Ce~sorship, :0, S, P?fli;:_~J:..._Q.gns_9..!:~i:E 
~egu:l:atl.Ol2;,?_, Edltl.OJ? _o~·. Aprll 13, 1942 ( i'/ashJ.ngton, D .c .: 
• ~3. Gove:nnnent P:nntJ.ng Office), 1942. 
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mail to prisoners of war, and the mailing of exposed and 
unexposed film. 23 Information prohi.blted from international 
mail was basically the same as that prohibited in cable, 
radio, and telephone communications that crossed the borders 
of the United States. 
The Office of Censorship hirGd thousands of ordtnary 
citizens who wen• trained as postal censors, Their tx·ain.ing 
-li.~sted h~ax>cl.ly ·nw:t-e than a week befox·e these peop1e \VGrG put-
t 1 . • • . . , 2Lf o WOJ..'t open1ng, exam:uu.ng, and censor:;_ng rnal.L, Included 
in this wide range of personnel were postal censon; who could 
2 ,. 
act as translators in mox·e thm1. a hund1·c;d l.8nguagec . . :; '.rhere 
were translators Vlho could rE:ad shorthG.nd in such c~sotcr·ic 
HinduE:tt~.ni (in :Braille! ) , 
Portuguese H.oman:i.:zed Japanese (Japanese language rtomani.H,d by 
Portuguese Catholic priestt>; also usecJ. by Japanesro who J.i ved 
in Brazil) , and PaiJiamento (a languz.ge comprising Du'tc)\, 
Spanish, Portuguese and: English) . 26 
In ,January of 1943 postal censorship regulations were 
included cable, :radio, a.nd. telc--· 
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phone regulations. This edition was then used intact for the 
duration of the war. One important section of these new 
postal censorship regulations prohibited the use of secret 
inlcs in international mail. 28 The inclusion of this prohi.-
bition resulted, in part, from the activities of a German 
agent, Ernest Lehmitz, who operated out of Staten Island. A 
summary of the Lehmi.tz. story follows below. 
Thf!._l•_el:lr!_!.L\:.~-§:~Or'~Y.:· In February of 1942, a letter 
mailed from New York to a suspicious address in Bilbao, Spain 
was intercepted and found to be carrying a secret message 
written with invisible i.nlc, For the next two months the 
Office of C:ensor:c<'lip c:are:fully v.ratched all mail from this 
person in Nrn¥ York. Tbe l0tter writor used two aliases in 
hi8 return acldl'ec'8es, "Fred I,ewis" aEd "Fred Sloane." His 
letters during this period were intercepted and all were 
found to be earr:y-ing t>ecret--ink messages, On April 11, 1942, 
nLewis" sent; his last mess~-}_ges, which stated, in inv:i.si ble 
in!\:, that he was suspending his operations, 'I'he letters were 
closed with "Heil Hitler." "J"ewis" had been writing to, 
among others, ~~n address in Portugal, 1'he Federal Bureau of 
Invec;tigation began a handwriting analysis of baggage deela-
rations of passengers from Portugal and a match was dis-
covered between "Fred I.ewis" and EnH3EJt Frederick Lehmitz of 
TompkinsviJ.lc, New York. Lehmi tz. was kept under sutveillance 
for more tlvm a year and in June, 1943 he was arrested. He 
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had operated a boarding house on Staten Island, specializing 
in rooms for sailors from whom he hoped to gather valuable 
shipping information. In September Lehmitz was sentenced to 
thirty years in prison for his activities. 29 Lehmitz's 
sentence, though severe, was not as harsh as that meted out 
to a German agent in Havana. This man, apprehended through 
the effqrts of American and British Censorship, was g1ven a 
highly scc:r.•et; · seveh hour miJ.i tary trial and then summarily 
shot by a firing squad of the Cuban army, 30 
Keeping a close watch for secret inks ws.B the job of 
the Technical Operations Division of the Office of Censorship,, 
This highly specialized and secret division enlic;ted the aid 
of chemistE, phygJ.cists, and ink and PHlJCJ:' :,:pecialists, 
Invisible inks Wfolre of two general types, 
included the use of milk,· vinegar, fruit ,juiceb, and urinrl ae. 
invisible ink, and all were used during the war, 1'hese 
elements could be applied to paper and would remain invisible 
until the paper had been heated, which would then eause the 
written message to appear, :I' he second type of invisible inks 
used what are known as symyJa'th<~tic chemicals, This involved 
using one ehemical to wri to an :i.nvicdble message and later 
applying a second chemical to the same paper to rencle:e the 
writing visible. 
2?For thcl J,ehmitz story see ~~I~~-.£n.._the _Qff:i.ce _9f 
Qer!fl.~£'.f1_hl.,J2, pp. ~·6 ... Lf7; see also Koop, .t?.P..1...£~~. , pp. ""8).:'8'?. 
3°sec ~rt on the Office of_f!"22§.£I.Sh)J·~, pp, IJ-5-1<;6; 
also Koop, E.E.· ci'F:IJJ5-;-·)::-rs, 
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The most popular methods for writing in invisible~ inlc 
were of the organic type, Enemy agents had to utilize the 
simplest methods and materials because they could not carry a 
large collection of supplies and chemicals with them at all 
times. Also, sophisticated chemicals could not always be 
obtained by an agent without arousing suspicion. For these 
reasons fruit juices -- and human urine -- were used quite 
--- - -f-req-uen·Gl-y-,--
With these simple methods and supplies enemy agents 
had to write -·- or print clearly, and their messages had 
to be simple and succinct. Often these messages appeared as 
though they had been written by a youngster, and this posed a 
special problem .·''or the Office of Censorship, Many ten-year-· 
old boys in the United States during the war were as fam:U.Ja.r 
with invisible ink manufactured from fruit juices or vim~g&.r 
as were enemy agents using the r.:mne methods, Many 
.American youngsters use.d these. homemade secret inks to send. 
"club" messages to one another through the U, S. MaiL 
Postal censors could not distinguish between the innocent 
secret ink message .of a ten-year-old club member and the con'" 
cealed message:3 of dangerous enemy agents, ~:here fore evex·y 
ins·tance of secret ink usage had to be investigated, and 
l''.B,I. agents, acting on Censorship information, often found 
themselves explaining to parents tlle reasons their young sons 
should not be allowed to continue usir,.g invisible inks, The 
young boys were clearly .. ". albeit innocently -- in violation 
of wartime censorship regulations and such violations could 
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bring a $10,000 fine and ten years in pri~on. Usually a 
visit to the parents of an unknowing young violator sufficed, 
but each investigation of invisible ink usage cost the uffice 
of Censorship much time and money during the war.31 
In addition to secret inks, postal censors had to be 
on the watch for "open codes," This was the prearranged use 
of apparently harmless numbers, letters, or· words that could 
-----------convey-- hi-dden messages. Such things as inter-na tione .. l che-ss 
games, the mailing of student's grades, letters with knitting 
instructions, or even the childish scrawl of an infant could 
in rea.lity be prearranged codes. These things were all 
prohibited in international. mail. One case of an open code 
using prearranged words brought a stJff pri.son sentence for 
Velvalee Dicldnscn, a dealer in dolls. A description of the 
Dickinson case is the next topic under postal censorship. 
'£he Dickinson story, Velvalee Dickinson was born in ________ , __ ~ ... 
Sacramento, California in 1893. As an adult she worked in 
San Francisco and was popular in J·apanese-American social 
life. In 1937 she moved to New York and opened an exchu;:iVcl 
doll shop. B~· 1942 she had a world-wide clientele, )Z 
In ,January of 19~-2 a Seattle woman contacted the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and gave them a letter that 
31Jiluch of this information on secret or invisible 
inks derived from interview with Norman Carlson, January 11, 
1972; see also Kahn, 2J2..:__£_~t., PP• 522-521+. 
, 3:-For the Dickinson story see R~J~~! on_.:~h!:- Offl:_~-~'2!. 
Cel!§.?_rshlp, pp. 48-49, and Koop, _2;e_._c:J. t., pp, 92-91). 
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had been "returned" to her from Buenos Aires. The letter had 
originally been mailed from the United States to Buenos Aires, 
but because the letter was incorrectly addressed the 
Argentine post office returned it to the return address given 
on the envelope. The return address on the envelope was that 
of the Seattle woman, but she stated that she !mew no one in 
Buenos Aires and had not mailed the letter. The letter con-
--------taine-d r!efere-nce --to a- bro-ken doll ~~dressed in a Hula Grass 
skirt." An added message said, " •.. I expect all damages 
to be repaired by the first week in February ... 33 
Shortly afterward an Ohio woman received a similar 
letter marked "Return To Sender," also from Buenos Aires. 
This letter bore her Ohio return address but had not been 
mailed by the Ohio woman. This letter said, "• •• Mr. Shaw 
will be back to work soon ... J4 On the chance :the letters 
might be coded messages the Office of Censorship checked all 
mail going to the address in Buenos Aires. Other letters 
were then intercepted containing odd messages that told of 
"dolls" being "repaired." Checking with the persons whose 
addresses were given as the return addresses on thesG letters 
to Buenos Aires, the J?,B.I. discovered that these women all 
knew VelvaJ.Ge Dickinson, an exclusive doll dealer in New York, 
In January of 1944 F.B.I. agents arrGsted Mrs, Die kin·~ 
son and searchGd her apartment, finding", , • Japanese 
3JKoop, 2l2..:_s:_it., p. 92. 
3\J;bid. ' p. 9 3. 
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clothing, records of Japanese music, • • •." and an address 
book containing the names of J'apanese friends )5 The letters 
Mrs. Dickinson mailed to Buenos Aires (she admitted mailing 
tl1em) were incorrectly addressed and therefore returned by 
the Argentine post office to the return address indicated on 
the envelopes, Many of the names and places Mrs. Dickinson 
used in these letters wer·e the same as the names of some 
' 
---------united s-tates -warships being repair~d cities; 
Apparently, "dolls" being repaired in San Francisco could 
mean "ships" being repaired in San Francisco, Some of the 
names used in Mrs. Dickinson's letters, such as "Mr. Shaw," 
matched those o:f well-knovvn warships, such as the "U, S. S, 
Shaw." 'l'he autho::·ities believed that Mrs. Dickinson 
attempted to convey information on the condition and locatic>n 
. . 36 of Amer:tcan and .AJ.l:Led war vessels. Mrs. Dickj_nson was 
charged with censorship evasion. A more serious charge would 
have been more difficult to prove, for there was apparently 
no proof that she had contacted an enemy of the United States. 
Velvalee Dickinson was found guilty of the lesser charge and 
. ' ' . 37 sentenced to ten years in prison and a $10,000 f1ne ,· 
Other postal censorship regulations required that 
stamp dealers and bon.a fide stamp colleetors acquire special 
35Ibid, , p, 97, · Incrc"dibly, Koop im})lies that aapa··· 
nese clothllig and ,Ta.panese phonograph n~cords found in !'irs, 
Dickinson's apartment constituted incriminating evidence! 
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permits from the Office of Censorship before they could mail 
stamps out of the country.J8 American postage stamps were 
nearly as good as American greenbacks and the government did 
not want these stamps to get into the hands of the Axis 
powers. One Presidential Cabinet member mailed a remittance 
of two d.ollars for a Nazi publieation in l\'iexico. When this 
remittance was returned to him by censors he protested and 
his mail was oxenl})t from censorship 
because of his official position. Byron Price replied to the 
irate Cabinet member that his office was ", • , charged with 
censoring all communications, not all except his."J9 
Postal censors discovered, through an intercepted 
letter, a shipment of • • 14-() d:Lamonds concealed :Ln chocolates. 
CensorcJ aJ.so dj.r;oovered a German cipher whereby an enti.re 
page, typewr·i ttm··, in code, was rEJd.uced to the siz.G of a 
period, which could then be hidden in an otherwicl<.l innocent 
letter. 41 Publishers o;f scientific or technical joiiX'rw.ls 
could apJJly· fo:c a. speoi.al license to mail their public<:.tioxw 
abroad only after signing affidavits stat1ng that employee's 
preparing articles for mailing wcH'e ", • • trustworthy and 
• e ~ not connt~cted with subversive activitieB ~ ~~ 1+ 2 
3~censorship Press Release No, 3"3, ( ?) _r:--·--~--··-~-----·-----~-----.. ··------·~-· n.d. [september, 
39Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. · 
!Viarch J.S, 1942. 
~ 
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Many persons tried to evade postal censors even 
though they were not attempting to aid the enemy. One man in 
New Zealand was fined for concealing a letter between the 
pages of a magazine he mailed to Utah. A woman tried to hide 
a letter in a basket of flowers as she entered the United 
States. She was caught and fined forty dollars for censor-
ship eva,slon. Shoes were a :f'avori te place o:f' coneealmcnt, 
for attempting to evade censorship in that manner. 
Postals censors also protected American investments 
and contracts by carefully examining .important business mail. 
In one case the United States had contracted for the entire 
output of Ecuadorian quinlne, whicll was used to combat 
malaria. An inter'cepted letter from a firm in Ecuadol:' told 
of a large transfer of quinine to a European port. 1'l:te ship-
ment, which the United States Government considered to be in 
violation. of its contract with Ecuador~- was already on its 
way to Europe by· sea. A United States destroyer was dis--
patch.ed and the quinine cargo was promptly seized on the high 
seas. In time of war anything is fair, even if it bordln·s 
on piracy! This was not the only case of seizure of cargo at 
cea. Censorship intercepts led. to the knowledge of' a vitally-
needed C<U'go of zinc. This ship was forceably turned. back to 
an American port and· the cargo commandeered. 
A Belgium firm operating out of the United States and 
specializing in the production of industrial. diamonds was 
found to be smuggling these diamonds into Europe. A letter 
J2 
from this firm to another in Sweden advised the Swedish firm 
that a shipment of steel twist drills would soon leave the 
United States. The letter instructed the Swedish firm to dip 
the drills in an acid bath. A postal censor thought this was 
rather severe treatment for steel drills and recommended an 
investigation. The drills were found to be hollow, filled 
with dtamonds, and capped with a bronz," plug. :rho acid bath 
woul-a-- me-lt --the- brony~-e plugs and expose the diarnond::; ~ The 
head of the firm in the United States was convicted of 
1 .. ' t d... . ''li+J censors up evasJ.on ana. sen ·ence .,o one year 1.11 Ja1. , 
The foregoin,r>; represent only a very small percentage 
of the exciting and successful activities of postal censors. 
Not all decisions by posta.l censors v,,exe quire so exciting, 
nor as easily un6.erstood, One magaz5.ne called the decision 
of' a postal censor "individual idiocy" when he censored. an 
American citizen's letter to a friend. in South America in 
which the American said. the United Sta·tes was in for a long, 
hard 'l'hree weeks after Pearl Harbor the Hawaiian vol-
cano 1\!auna Loa erupted, belching smoke and fire. Local cen-· 
sors carefully deleted all reference to the eruption in mall 
leaving Hawaii on the grounds that, because the flames from 
the eruption were visible at night, the J'apanese might use 
1\!auna Loa as a beacon for another assault on Hawali. 45 1\!aybe 
_____ ......,.. __ _ 
4·3 ~-ort on t~~ Office of Cen~_9£Sh~J2• pp. 1+5-53· 
1942, 
1+1+ 
"Nonsense by the Censor," .J:lew Re;eulH-ic, July 13, 
p. 36. 
45Koop, £:Q_: __ S.~.!,, pp" 66-67 · 
the censors felt the Japanese navy had forgotten how to get 
to Hawaii after three long weeks! In February of 194·2 Los 
An~ele_§__':£im!"s issues being sent to Mexico (and other 
countries) by U. S. Mail were, without the publisher's 
knowledge, subjected to "raz.or blade" C(msoring by postal 
JJ 
censor's before being sent on to the subscribers. At the same 
time newspapers originating in Texas and presumably carr;ring 
------------------t-he- same s-y-ndicated articles arrived in Mexico untouched by 
the censor's razor blade. One item deleted from the Los 
An~Seles Times by postal censors concerned the funeral of 
l.j.6 Carole Lombard. 
There is some evidence that postal censorship wa.s 
used in attempts to muzzle critics of the Roosevelt admin:i.s-
tration. Wendell Willkie engaged in what J'ames MacG1·egor 
BurnB calls "constructive criticism" of the Roosevelt adJ:ninis-
tration. 47 Willkie, a supporter of individual rights aiid an 
ardent internationalist., criticized the government for its 
slowness in civil rights, and urged Roosevelt to establish a 
"second front" to help Russia. Willkie, "goading the 
President," according to some persons, 48 criticized the 
"racists and reactionaries" of the Democratic pa:cty, He also 
h 6News story from. "Editor and Publisher," February 21, 
191-1-2, p. 6, reprinted in Robert E. Summers ( comp.) , Wartime 
.9..~~-§.(Jrfl.bl}l __ ()_f.,., Pre83.2~?-E~c:lc.. Radio (New York: H. w. Wilsoii-(S'cimpany, 19'-'·2), pp. 181+-1 5· 
I+?,Tames MacGregor Burns, Hoosevelt: The Soldier of 
F'reedom (New York: Harcourt. Brace-Jovanov-ich ,--rnc-::1, -9-'?''()T, 
:r:-T74-: VJ 
~-sit?.!.~, • P. 4J7. 
charged Roosevelt with "• , • one-man rule, confused adminis-
tratlon, [and] self-perpetuation in power , .. 49 • • 
Willkie chided Roosevelt for not using 
50 aggresFJively following Pearl Harbor. 
the u. s. Navy more 
HiB continuous 
attacks on the RooFJevelt adrniniBtration ", •• covered 
generally the wide range habitual to the leader of the 
opposition party • 
' . 
.. 51 
was preparing to V·lri tE~ articles 
for the London Evenin(f Standard. Roosevelt was "scared" that 
Willlcie 's discourse on foreign affairs, "which he does not 
c2 
understand," would damage international relations.::> The 
President instructed Price to visit Willkie and explain that 
f). ~ " he mu.st svbm.i t to censorship at the border like ever~r ... , 
one else," 53 'rhis was done a.nd Willkie dJ.d not like it. He 
continued to cri i.j.cize the administratlon and the Office: cf' 
Censorship for their policies. He rebuked Price for allowing 
a speech by Vice-President Henry Wallace to leave the United 
States undelayed to be reprinted in England. Willkie's 
articles, however, were delayed by censors before they were 
allowed to leave the country. 5lJ· 
IJ-9 .. ]. bHJ,, , p • LJ99 • 
50J.b" ' 
.-:...2:S!- 11 : 
"1 )·Byron 
''2 )""]"b"d 
. l - ~ 
p. 222 • 
Price to writer, December 20, 1971. 
Pr~ce quotes Roosevelt. 
''3 
. .l Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
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· ""Koop, .?]l_:. ci·~., pp. 252-251+, 
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This was not the only time censorship would be used 
in an attempt to muzzle a critic of the administration. In 
early 19Lf4· the private correspondence of Vivien Kellems, an 
Alnerican citizen .and frequent administration critic, was 
made public on the floor of Congress. A furor arose that 
involved President Roosevelt, Congress, and the Office of 
Censorsl~ip, That affair is the next, and last, story under 
p-ostal ce:nSoi'sh-ip--~---
The Kellems stor;y. To begin thG Kellems story it is 
necessary to describe a basic postal censorship procedure, 
The United States and British Censorship offices utilized a 
"watc;h list" of German nationals living in various parts of 
th~c"l world, Using this Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked 
Nationals.55 eenso:cs could watch for mail to certain indivi-
3.5 
duals in certain cities. Many cities of South America and 
Europe were believed to be centers of Axis activlty. Buenos 
Aires was one, and "• • , anything to or from Lisbon was sure 
to be opened ... .5 6 Important passages taken from mctil to and 
from these German nationals were labeled "Intercept" and 
relayed to appropriate agencies having an intet"est in their 
contents. Thus censored portions of ci ti7.ens letteJ~s were 
distributed into many hands. These "intercepts" were, of 
course, treated as secrets.· But when a secret is shar·0cl by 
"" 
.>;;Report on the Office of Censorshjp, p, 11. 'rhe 
number of-nam"es on t!iTs~';wa'EcJi TTs0t;•--r·Tucli:!ated betwe~>n 
7.5,000 to 100,000 persons; see Knight, .2.l2.:_~cit,, p. 80, 
.5 6 .. Intereepts," N~w Y _?rk~, May 11, 19'~·6, p. 22, 
too many people, it soon loses its element of secrecy. 
Vivien Kellems was an American industrialist. She 
headed a successful manufacturing firm in Connecticut. She 
had long been a vocal critic of the operations of the 
Roosevelt administrations, especially of the various income 
tax laws. In 19L1-2 Miss Kellems ran for Congress but was 
~ H defeate~ by Clare Boothe Luce in the IJ:Cimaries, 57 In J~anuary 
L __ ~ ·- of-194·~ -vivien Kellems voiced her intention to rc~fuse to pay 
a portion of her 191J-3 income tax. In adcU·Uon Bhe urged 
other industrialists to do the same.58 Miss Kellems, who 
traced her heritage to 1636 in Virgini.a,59 declared the 
employee withholding tax laws to be ", , illegal, immoral, 
d t . t t. ] . ,. 60 an . uncons· l _,)). J..ona"' · To support her statement she woulcl. 
quote scripture~ from the Bible: 
And it came to pasrJ in those days 
that there went out a decree from 
Caesar Augustus, that all the world 
should be taxed. And all went to be 
taxed, everyone into his own oi.ty.61 
Secn;tary of the ~.'reasury Henry Morgenthau cri ti.cized Miss 
Kellems's ~J"i:;atementG as "smacking of dislo;y-alty. " 62 On the 
5?Anna Rothe (ed.), Current Biographv (New York: 
H. W. Wilson Company, 1948) ·;···i)P. y,co.~ J!Tz ;~ 
58 l~'b .. , Ji11 ,:_~.2,9. • ~ P e ') · . e 
l'O 
.;/Vivien Kellems, ToLL, ~'axes and Troub10 (New York: 
E , P , Dutton , 1 9 52 ) , p • ro.--·-···-·~··---~-------··-----
60J:_bi~. • p. 8. 
61 Quoted in .ibi£., p. 18; the passage is J.,uke 2:1~·3· 
6'> 
"'Hothe, 2J?.: ... S':~J:, , p, JLH, 
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floor of the House of Representatives, Congressman John 
Coffee of Washington said lVJiss Kellems' remarks on the with-
holding of payment of her taxes were "highly dangerous." He 
accused Miss Kellems of "downright subversive conduct" 
because she called on other employers to follow her example 
of noncompliance with the tax laws, The Congre llSman hardly 
meant to_ praise the lady when he implied that the profits 
----franc n.e-r --c-ompany- (-which had defense contracts)- "a ~ • were 
earned through the blood , . ," of her countrymen fighting i.n 
the front lines. Coffee further characterized Miss Kellems 
as a "P-A-Y-triot," rather than a patriot, and said that by 
her statements ". . , she is, in effcc~t, worldng to bring 
abov.t the <~sta,bl:t;,hment of fascism • , ~ n in America~ 63 
Shortly a:fter Coffee made his remarks on the floor of 
64 < the Hour3e, coh'nmJ.st Drew Pearson, in a radio commentary, 
reported that Vivien Kellems had been correspomUng privately 
with a "blocked" German. national living in Argentina. Pear·· 
son even quoted directly f'rom one of lVJi.ss Kellems' private 
. 6S letters to this German na t1onal, · A furor aro[;e over 
Pearson's quoto.tions from one of Miss K.ellews' IH"ivate 
letters. Where had he gotten the private correspondence of 
an American citiz.en'? Was not the privacy of the United 
States lViail inviolate? 
Pt. 
78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944), 
J8 
On March Jl, 1941+, Congressman Coffee again mounted 
his pulpit to inveigh against Vivien Kellems. Further clas-> 
sifying her remarks on taxation as "sabotage," he said Vivi0:n 
Kellems' public statements were motivated by", , • seditious 
enemy influences •• , ," 66 Casting doubt and suspicion on 
Miss Kellems's loyalty, Coffee echoed Drew Pearson's charges 
that she ", , , has for some 2 [sic] years been carrying on 
----------with --a --wcll.:..known Na:z,i age:nt named C ou.nt F::r·ede::cick Kar-1 von 
Zedlitz in Buenos Aires, Argentina." 67 But what came next 
from Congressman Coffee was even more surpx-·ising, for he 
began to quote verbatim from Miss Kellems' personal corr(lS-
pondence to and from von Zedlitz. Cof:fee stated that Miss 
Kellems addressed this "N11zi agent" as "My· darling boy" and 
signed her lettex·s to him with "All my love, sweetheart, 
Vivien." This was exrJlosive! A United States Congressman 
had somehow come into possession of' an American d.tizcn' s 
private correspondence,.and then made that correspondence 
public, There was only one ultimate source for these 
excerpts from this lady's priv-ate correspondence ··- the U. S. 
Office of' Censorship, or one of its cooperating agencies. 
" • • • 
Concl.uci:Lng his characterization of Miss Kellems as a 
tool of the Goebbels propaganda machine [and] the 
].over o:f a HitJ.er fifth column spy • , , ," Congressman 
Coffee thr'm cl.e:fen:ed further critic ism, citing ". , , the 
66 . ,5L?J]J!;E2§E]c2.!.1~~ Recox-:9,, 78th Gong., 2nd Sess. ( 19frlf) , 
Pt. 90, 1\o, 3, p. 33o9. 
67:1~~s .• p. 3370. 
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rules of etiquette and the spirit of fair.play " • • 
Coffee refrained from further disclosure of !'lliss Kellems's 
private correspondence with von Zedlitz, because, he said, it 
afforded him", •• no pleasure to refer to the personal life 
f 1 d . . t• l 68 o any a y Ul. a crl ·lca . way," 
Vivien Kellems immediately protested this invasion of 
her privacy and an invesUgation was launched l.Jy the Senate 
--c-ommittee-on-Post-Off'ices and Post Roads. 
that crossed the borders of the United States was subject to 
compulsory censorship, and this included the Kellems-Zed.litz 
letters. In addition, Zedlitz was a known German national 
living in Argentina; correspondence between he and any person 
in the United States would receive strict su.r,loillance :from 
poGtal censors. l'-1isB Kellems logically charged that someone 
in the Of:fice of CensOl'sh.i.p, or in some other government 
agency to which Censorship intercepts had been sent, had 
leaked her private corr.espondence to unauthorized ind.i vi duals 
and that these individuals had illegally disclosed portions 
of her letters to Pearson and Coffee, 1'he Senate Committee 
concurrecl. 
Byron Price, as Director of the Office of Censorship, 
was the first witness to testify before a sub--committee han~ 
dling the .investigation. Price expressed his belief that the 
Kellems--Zedlitz correspondence had been leaked by some govern-
ment a.gency other than the Office of Censorship. He empha-
68Il:l.2:• • P• 3.37L 
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sized the fact that other goverrunent agencies were privy to 
Censorship intercepts. Under order of a subpoena, Price 
produced in executive session copies of' the Kellerns-Zedlitz 
correspondence, but because these intercepts contained secret 
censorship markings they were not made available in public 
session. In December, 1944, Vivien Kellems said that she 
believed she knew how the intercepts were leaked to Pearson 
1------- and-Coffee and offered to state these beliefs to tho SLlb-
j ~- committee in executive session. The sub-committee, however, 
! requested that she testify in public session. She refused 
and the Senate Committee dropped its investigation without 
submitting a re11ort, 69 Kellems contended that the I{oosevel t 
admin.ist:raticm purposel~r leaked her correspondence in 
reta1iation for her opposition to government policies.7° 
On May 23, 191+1+, Price testified that Zedlitz had 
communicated with a number of persons in the United States.71 
However, Vivien Kellems -was the only one of these persons 
whose correspondence was leaked and made public. She was 
also the only one of these persons who had publicly 
criticized the administration. Price was questioned about 
the importance of including in Genso1~sl1ip intercepts such 
personal phrases as "My darling boy" and "All my love, 
sweetheart," His answers largely evaded the question, 
69JJ.S:EE'.'f:i.:..}2.:l.._!!!2 __ Q:t£Lce o(, Ce!.J_SOJ?~hh?., pp. l.J-11+. 
7°Koop, _5Jl'..:.-9.Lt., , p. 13'?. 
71I£.iq. • p. 1J8. 
\ 
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~-'here were only three agencies that received the 
Kellems-Zedli tz intercepts: British Censorship, the Office of 
Strategic Services, and the State Department. Neither 
British Censorship nor the Office of Strategic Services were 
questioned by the sub-committee, The State Department, how-
ever, testified that it had distributed the intercepts to at 
least two other subordinate agencies. 1'hese two agencies 
---,------roper-ted -tha-t--their copies of the Kellems-Zndlitz intercepts_ 
had been destroyed,72 
So the leak was never official.ly discovered.- The 
Kellems affair was closed. Vivien Kellems absolved Byron 
Price of any guilt, implying that he was following instruc-
tions from higller authority, 73 According to Byron .Frice, the 
Director of ·the Office of Censorr;hip was ", , , responsible 
only to the" Commander-In-Chief himself , 7 ~-" ' " 0 
During the Kellems investigation _:L'ime magazine 
reported that " . . all Washington knew-that someone in the 
Office of Censorship slipped the juicier portions of the 
72 . . Ibld., pp. 1)8-139. These intercepts from the 
·Office of Cerisorshi:p to other government agencies all bore 
the following notice: '".Che attached information was taker1 
from private communications, and its extremely confidential 
character nmst be preserved, The :i.nfon11ati.on must be 
c:on:fided only to ·those officials whose knowledge of it is 
necessary to the prosecution of the war. In no case should 
it bG widely distributed, or copies made, or the information 
used in legal proceedings or in any other public way without 
express consent of the· Director of Censorship," Cited in 
~orl .... 2.E~_:~~--Pf:J:Lce _££._ Censors!ljc:P.• p, '7. -
?"i 
-Koqp, op. c:it., p. 11+2. 
?4 Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
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Kellems-von Zedlits Correspondence to columnist Drew Pearson 
and Representative Coff'ee,"75 Price, however, was·satisf'i.ed 
that ". • • no one in Censorship was to blame ... 7 6 He 
contacted Drew Pearson and personally asked him" .•• to 
refrain from publishing any more such material and none 
appeared in print thereafter ... ?? According to Byron Price, 
"The censors take every precaution to keep the mail as secure 
-possible .. 78 In the Kellems ca_ge, 
someone failed. 
The Office of Censorship acted as an intelligence 
gathering agency which dispensed confidenthtl information to 
other agencies of the government. Thus the Department o:f 
State, thB F.B.I., the Army, and many other government 
depr~rtments, would request that the Office of Censorship 
provide them with information the;v felt was important to 
their operations. The various government agencies would tlwn 
"act" upon the information provided by the Office of Censor .• 
ship. In the ear-ly years of the war these "acting agencies," 
as they were collectively called, often exercised their 
privileged right to Censorship intelligence to the fullest 
extent. Indeed, some agencies, and particularly the State 
1941+, 
75"'I'he Administration: l''aithless," 'I'~e._, April 17, 
p. 23. 
76Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971. 
'??Ibid. 
?BQ ~ d . El . d P ' uo <A~ 1n o .mer Dav1s an Byron . rlce, War 
Inf'oiJ~ia!io:~.!l,~~.~-~-l:!S2E~J7Jr ~Washington, D.C.:. AmerTcim Eounc1~ on Publ1o Affalrs, L194J]), p. 6J, 
Department, the Army, and the F',B.I., requested that the 
Office of Censorship provide them with all information of a 
suspicious nature, even though that information had no 
apparent relationship to the agency making the request. In 
43 
effect, these agencies wanted, and in the first months of the 
war received, free and full access to Censorship intelligence. I B:y-:r·on Price soon became concerned with the practice 
1----- --orproviding-ul'1limited information to these actlng agencies 
and decided to incorporate a new policy within his office, 
Price had made a visit to some offices of the Department of 
State and discovered "stacks" of Censorship intercepts 
excerpts from the private correspondence of American 
ci tizenr~ -·· in m;_locked storer·oomc. He then ded.decl that the 
number of int.e:ccr>pts provided to these acting agencies would 
be limited to only those that the Office of Censorship felt 
the acting agency required. Blanket requests for information 
from the F.B.I. and the Army were denied, and each request 
for information received from these agencies was then decided 
on its individual requirements. The tendency of these acting 
agencies to request more confidential information than they 
actually required was a problem with which Byron Price had to 
?O deal for the duration of the war. ~ 
Postal censorship continued to .:function, even though 
the Kellems affa.ir was somewhat embarrassing. :there were 
791'he above information on the re la tionshi.p betwGfm 
the Office of Censorship and other government agencies based 
on interview with Norman Carlt>on, January· 11, 1972. 
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other times when postal censorship came underfire. lViany· of 
these instances involved postal censorship of the press and 
will be treated under the subject of voluntary censorship in 
this paper. 
Two months before General Eis-enhower's forces landed 
on the beaches at Normandy postal censors took special 
precautions with mail going to servicemen overseas. These 
precau.-tions- include-d -stringent censorshil) 
United States to servicemen overseas, and" •. an arbitrary 
ten-day delay •.• " of mail coming to the United States from 
"l"t 1 . E 80 m~ ~ ary personne ~n urope. "When the Director Ol'dered 
all mail from servicemen in England impounded during a short 
period before D-Day he_ was showered with inquirie8 and pro-
tests but received [only] a single x·eally al)U.sive letter. "81 
Following V-E Day postal censorship of mail to Europe was 
relaxed and postal censors concentrated their effod;s on the 
war with Japan in the PaciJic, 
There was another form of compulsory censorship that 
deserves some mention. Military censorship had been in 
effect since Pearl Harbor. While military censorship was an 
effort independent of the Off'ic:e of Censorship, the functions 
of the two censoring agencies often overlapped and ccmflicted 
with one another. Further sections of this paper will touch 
upon military censorship as it came into contact -- and 
80~9..£G on the_Q.ff:l_ce O!:_C.~l2.i?,El'SI')j.J?., pp, 14-15, 
81
rsyron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
conflict -- with the Office of Censorship. But a brief view 
of military censorship is in order here before the reader 
moves on to those sections. 
'l'he Army and Navy retained censorship jurisdiction 
over thei.r personnel ancJ. ove1· journalists operating in the 
---------
·theaters of v<ar. All mail from servicemen overseas past>ed 
through either Army or Navy censorship before it was dis-· 
patched to the United States. These military censors had to 
watch for and delete any refEn~ence to the location of mili-
tary personnel, units, or equipment. Soldiers and sailors 
were seldom allo·N<ld to tell their families where they were, 
MiLi.tHry CE'nsors ~""'>re stationed at vrcrious maLL dispatch 
poin.ts wherever troops were located. Each Navy censor· n,acl. 
an average of' thirty letters per day mailed by sailors. 
Thetoe letters averaged two thousand words each, so that each 
Navy censor read about sixty thousand words each day. 
According to one source, out of sixty thousand words read 
daily, only ten would have to be deleted by the censor. 82 
This type of censorship activity was the daily ritual of 
military censors. ~-'here were other a.g,t.ivi ties by military 
censors that could not be called daily ritual. 
American correspondents with military units overseas 
had to sign agreements that they would submit all of their 
8~' 
--,James D. Johnson, We Censors are Frustrated 
Hmnnns," §::::.~:u~<:J,.§:.'Ll~.:Y-~2.~!l£"~..,}'Of2~~. September 22, 1945, p. Jl+. 
material to mili.tP..ry censorship before it was dispatched. 
Civilian censorship in the United States usually utilized a 
rule such as "Will the publication of this material help the 
enemy?" Military censors, both at horne and abroad, usually 
added another guideline, such as "Is publication of this 
material good for the Anily?"SJ Therefore, military censors 
'I ~ could justify suppresrd.on of nearly any material they· did not 
j _______ -- --v:ant 
I strateg.i,c value~ 
I Using this rule military censors often adopted rather 
str:Lc·i; policies, One Army General in Cairo in the summer of 
l.91+Li- called in the correr;pondents in his area and delivered 
the following lecture to them, 
l\ly m.LL.i.tary censors are going to examine 
eve:rythinc; you write about this theater, 
whet .. twr it; concerns politics or anything 
olc;e, 'Hw:ce wLU be nothing eri tical of 
th5.s theater sent out o·f here by you 
gentlemen. If any of you think he may 
be inclined to write anything critical, 
he may as well leave now, And don't go 
complaining to the War Depa:c·tment. I 
don't intend to have any interference 
in my theater. Sl.f 
Some reporters attempted, by cable and by letter.', to relay 
the General's remarks to friends and emplo~y·ers. These cable:3 
and letters were summarily stopped on the General's orders. 
Another case of military cem;ort>hip concerned the 
infamous soldier-slapping incident involving General George 
Patton. In August of 1943 General Patton visited a field 
SJ~ · 't 261 h.oop, ~-£2::..-. , p, , , 
814. ' • ' QUlTtPd J.n Erlc SevareJ.d, "CenBorship :i.n the 
Saddle," .tJ~t .. !·.:\:52.:'~· April 11+, 19'1·5, p. IJ.16. 
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hospital in Sicily where he came upon a soldier who was 
physically unhurt, but suffering from "nerves." Patton 
became enraged, called the soldier a "dirty no-good son of a 
bitch," a "coward," and "a disgrace to the Army," 85 Patton 
then slapped the soldier's face, telling him he would either 
be sent to the front lines to fight, or be shot by a firing 
squad of his fellow soldiers. News of the incident spread 
------T.lke- wHcf.:.fire. G€meral Eisenhower, in his book f~l'l-~d,E?,~IJ~ 
;g;uro~, states that no effort was made to suppress news of 
the incident. 86 However, it was some months after the 
incident before the American public read the story. 87 
According to Theodore Koop, who was the Assistant Director of 
the Office of CerwonJhip, military authori tics tried to 
nuppress the Patton incid(mt even after it had reached the 
United States. Koop says the Off.iee of Censorship declined 
to rule against publication and the story was printed. 88 
Journalists in the United States also had to contend 
with military censors whose rulings were often difficult to 
comprehend, One such incident t~1ok place in 191+2 when a 
group of correspondents were invited by the government to 
8 5Quoted in Richard R. Lingeman, Don.•t You K11ow 
Ther'e's A War On? The Amroriean Home Front,--T9lf1--19ir5 ... (New 
Y oi:j'C-;~-I~ ,-p-;-·;o\itriam's-s 6i1s , 'T9 7 oT;-})"j)7'"~29 9- :Ji:To ; s e e-·ais o 
Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's sto1·y (New Yorl~t Popular 
J~.i brary, l9 51) , pji;-:-To5·-I 1)8~-----·" 
86Dwight D. Eisenhfwer, f!~ll'!~.~ In I~g::.:·op~ (Garden 
City: Doubleday & Co., 19 f8), p. l8c .• 
87Ibid. 
88KooiJ, P.P:. ... cL~. 
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make a tour o:t' war plants. At one plant the reporters were 
allowed to view and later describe in detail a new fifty 
caliber machine gun then in production. However, when their 
stories were submitted to military censors all reference to 
the ealiber of the ammunition for this gun was summarily 
0 89 blue-penc~led! The irate reporters a.lso protested the 
fact that the censored informa,tion was passed intact in news-
military censors replied that because the reporters' news-
papers had a wider circulation than the local pa11ers censor-
ship of the information in question was justified,90 
Incidents such as these were often the result of 
attempts by overz.ealous military eensors to protect the war 
eff'ort of the;, United Sta.tes. Such stringent censorship 
motivated Byron Price to d.:Lsavow the autJ:wri·~y of some m.i.li-
tary· censors, In late 191+J he issued the following statement 
to newspaper publishers: 
I solicit your continued cooperation to 
see . , • that a dangerous psychology of 
overcensorship is not created throughout 
the land by the activities of a miscellany 
of' volunteer f'iremen.91 
Price was concerned that reporters and publ:Lshers might be 
censoring to·o much material at the reque:st of military 
cem:ors who had the "morale" of the Army in mind rather than 
89"Censorship Fanta· NJ.·a," "'J..E!__e, July 8 19''2 64 
- u ~ - ' ..,._, p. • 
90lb:Ld. 
9lQuoted in Koop, .<:JJl..c ci -~. , p. 26/t. 
the strategic value of the material i tsel.f'. There were many 
incidents of overzealous military censorship, some of which 
will be recounted in the chapter on voluntary censorship. 
Compulsory censorship was the first line of defense in 
the wa1' on words from 1942-1945. Censorship was a military 
weapon9 2 designed to deprive the enemy of information, 
friends, and commodities that he could urJe against the Allies; 
it was- also used- t6 collect intelligence that cou]..;l be 
against the enemy.93 Perhaps this section on compulsory 
censorship can close on a humorous note. Censors had 
to keep a close watch on the possibility of enemy agen·tE: 
using carrier pigeons to transmit mHssages. 9~· Researeh 
failed to tHrn up evidence of o;hotgun-carrying ceneo1:c 
scanning the ski8s, 
The ne~t chaptel' deals with voluntary censorship of 
the American press and radio. This "delie:ate and explosive" 
task required less than one percent of the budget and 
personnel of the Office of Censorship.95 It also required a 
tremendous amount of perserverance and patience from the 
people of the press, the radio, and the Of':fice of Censorship, 
p' 2' 
93£1:eport~p tl]~_Q,ffice o_L9m~Esh~E• p, 1. 
91+c h. £'±'. · 1 · · · ~ ensors lp o· . J.c1a s were ser1om; concerrnng thls 
possibility; see Davb and Price, .2£_~_Eit,, p. 65. 
95Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
IV 
VOLUNTARY CENSORSHIP: 
THE SECOND LINE OF DEPENSE 
The Voluntar;y: Codes 
When President Roosevelt chose Byron Price as the 
Director of the Office of Censorship, he instructed him to 
", , , coordinate the voluntary effort of press and radio to 
withhold from circulation information which would aid the 
enemy in his p:cw;<ecution of the war," 1 The Office of Censor-
shi.p had to beco1•1e a cleton·ing hous~J for information 
disseminated by thousands of radio stations, newspapers, and 
other journals throughout the country. It had to request 
that these publishers and broadcasters withhold, at the dis-
cretion of the government, any information that might pre ju .. 
dice the United States and Allied forces in their prosecution 
of the war; at the same time it had to guarantee the consti., 
tuticma.l rights of free speech and a free press, This was, 
theoretically, an almost impossible position. According to 
Byron Price, there was one rule that had to be observed if 
voluntary censorship was to succeed: "Censorship of the 
dissemination of public infor·rnation must hold U.'1ceasingly, 
.. ,,.,_,_,,._. ___ .___ _ 
1Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
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day in and day out, to the single purpose of keeping 
dangerous information from the enemy." 2 The only alternative 
was, obviously, compulsory censorship. Nearly everyone 
loathed the idea of imposing compulsory censorship on the 
press and radio, and the Office of Censorship wasted little 
time in issuing voluntary censorship codes for these media. 
~'he first voluntary codes, the C£2·e _g:f War:dm"' P::-ac;;.-
-------- tices- fo-:c--Ameri-can --Broadcasters and the Code of Wartime 
--· ----~-· ----~-~--~- ·---·----·-·-'----"~ 
Pr§_~tice:~~Am::rican ]':t:_('JSS, were issued on January 15, 
194·2.3 It is worthwhile to describe these codes in depth. 
( 1) News Programs 
( '> ' G) Acl-I,:i.b Programs 
( J) Foreign J"anguagc Programs 
In disseminating certain material b:coadcaster<> were advised 
to ask themselves "Would this material be of value to me if I 
were the enemy?" 4 The code requested that the following 
elements of news programs be kept off the air unless that 
2Historical Heports on War Administration, A H.E)J:>OJ?.! 
on the Office of Censorship (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Govern--
men-i"Pr"l11'ETri'f;·151'1Tce-;l:97+SY, p. 2; hereafter referred to as 
Heport _ _2I!:..._!.he O~fice _of C2_(:E.~~ors[lit. 
3u. s. Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime 
Practices for American Broadcasters, -·pr<Iffi'on ofJanuary l.5., 
1942]-( wasJ1:lngfon-,-D .c-::~-u-;-·s·.--·crov'ernment [Printing Office]) , 
f1942]; hereafter referred to as Code for Broadcasters 
\1-15-42); and u. s. Office of Censorsh:lp-;---cc;·a:e-·ar wartime 
Practices for the American Press, [Ecli tion oi,....JiiinuaryT~ 
1942] rviar;hii'i;sCtori~-D ."C:--:!U.-s .-Government Printing Office) , 
1942; hereafter referred to as f_9_de _}.£E.J:he JC._ress (1 .. 15-42) , 
I 
's_;oq_e for Bro;c~_de<::.9!5!!S ( 1 .. 15o.Lf2), p. 2. 
information had been released by appropriate <mthori ty: 
weather reports, including temperature and barometer 
readings, wind directions, forecasts, ·and "all other data" 
relating to weather conditions; and the location, movement, 
identity, strength of, or information concerning troops, 
ships, planes, experiments, fortifications, industrial war 
l.
·_-___________ -~r .. oduc:t:i.on, c:asuali ty lists, selective 
••- .,. ........ H"'~-''V>.; __ r.r._+{AY"Irt -~f'ar-.11; +i aQ 5 
- V-.l.- I.; VJUJIH..'.J.!-1.\...oCI,; 1.1.1.. >:IJ.-J.u- ,<:-~...;, ""-'_.._-.... ~;.....,._,....., • 
service enrollments, 
Radio broadcasters were cautioned not to give 
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credence to unconfirmed reports of any kind. These included 
ship sin!dngs, enemy claims, and obvious fallacies, 6 These 
reports were to be broadcast only after official confirmation 
hy the Office of Cenr~orship or otheJ: ap~propriate authority. 
A general provis.i.on requested that radio stations not 
disclose the nEJw location of the National Archives, which had 
been moved, or movements of "bhe President of the United 
States or of any military or diplomatic missions. The code 
also requested that broadcasters remove or seriously curtail 
the following types of ad-lib radio programs: 
(a) H.equest programs 
(b) Quiz programs 
(c) Porurns al}.d Interviews (ad lib) 
(d) Commentaries and descriptions (ad lib) 7 
pp. 2-3· 
p. 3. 
p. 4. 
I 4---
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Radio stations were asked to suspend for the duration of the 
war the acceptance of telephoned or telegraphed requests for 
musical selections. It was feared these requests, if honored, 
could be used as open codes by enemy agents. Mail requests 
for musical selections could be accepted only if radio 
stations were careful not to play the selections on the day 
and time requested. I,ost and found requests were to be 
-hC>IlOred Only Oll \qritten teqUe St 1 not by telephone o Quiz 
programs that involved audience participation were to be 
discontinued or carefully supervised, for it was felt that 
public accessabili ty to open mi.cro1)hones was dangerous, 
especially when there were no prior arrangements for investi-
gating the bacl.q;;round of the participants. 'rhi.s restriction 
vlas mainly dil"'ect:ed to nman ... in~ ... _the~~streetu interviews t but 
simil;;r rea. sons v;ere given for eliminating or restricting 
forums and commentaries. 8 
Broadcasters were requested to maintain full tran-
scripts of all foreign language programs, and to guard 
against any deviation from these scripts by foreign language· 
announcers and performers (any language other than English 
was considered a foreign language), Broadcasters were also 
". • • a.dvised to steer clear of dramat:i.c programs which 
attempt to portray the horrors of' combat • , • , .. 9 It was 
felt that such dramatic·programs might be too realistic and 
8 . Ibi~ .• pp. 5-6. 
9 ;lbid. ' p. 7. 
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have an adverse effect on radio listeners. 
This initial code for broadcasters could not foresee 
all future possibilities and therefore was not to be inter-
preted as containing all possible restrictions on the use of 
the domestic radio system. If broadcasters doubted any 
material being considered for programming they were advised 
to contact the Office of Censorship for clarification. 
the Code for Bro~dcaste~, superceded and consolidated a 
miscellany of requests previously made by various agencies of 
the Federal Governrnent. 10 This first press code generally 
repeated the same restrietions enumerated in the radio code 
of tho same date, Information Y'(~gar~ting troops r ships~ 
planes, industrial wal' production, and ·the location of 
faetoX'J.es c:ou.ld :·Jot be reportcJcl. in America.n newspapers unless 
that information had been released for publication by 
official authority. 
Newspapers were asked to exclude weather forecasts 
and weather "round-up" reports unless they had been released 
by -the Weather Bureau, Routine weather foreoasts printed by-
any single newspaper oould cover- only the State in which the 
paper was printed, ". • • and not mo1·e thah four.· adjoining 
States, portions of which lie within a radius of 150 miles 
from the point of publication." 11 
1
°Code for the Press (1-15-42), p. 1. 
--·~-•v-·-~---~·~• 
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The exclusion of weather news would, according to the 
Office of Censorship, deprive the enemy of the ability to 
forecast weather conditions in parts of the United States. 
Enemy naval craft operating in the Atlantic carried 
experienced meteorologists as senior officers. Radio 
broadcasts of currcmt weather reports from as few <:fl three l well-separated Western :points could effectively provide theBe 
L_ __ ~----enemy meteorologists with enough .information to forecast 
Eastern weather conditions. For example, "• • a few drops 
of rain at El Paso, high winds at KansaEl City, and a snowfall 
in Detroit will indicate to enemy ships which parts of tho 
[East] coa.st will have rough weather or fog a day or two 
later," 12 
But it W<l.>o difficul:l; to use this line of reasoning to 
justify the excll:ts:i.on of weather news in newspapers. An 
enemy agent who read a weather forecast in a newspaper would 
still have to communicate this information to his comrades at 
sea. In the case of a weather forecast by radio the communi.,. 
cation would be nearly instantaneous, the need for the agent 
eliminated, and the exclusion of the forecast justified. 
Censorship regulations excluding weather news in newspapers 
was recognized as illogical by many publishers and received, 
at best, hal:f~heartcd compliance. 
12
nirector of the Office of Censorship, PR-36, 
[Press Relet<_se No. 36_] (Washington, D.C.: u. s.-OITTce of 
Censorship, October 29, 191-1-2), p, 6; hereafter these Censor .. 
ship press releases shall be referred to as Censorshir) Press 
Re}e_?.se N~·---• (date). -------~----·-
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'l'his first press code contained a :restriction against 
the publishing of pictures or maps that were related to those 
subjects excluded from publi.cation. 13 A general provision 
requested that there be no publication disclosing the 
location of the National Archives or the movements of the 
President of the United States or of military or diplomatic 
missions, Anytime a publisher suspected material being 
------considered f-or-publ-ication he was dirGcted to contact the 
Office of Censorship for clarification. Also, if a publisher 
doubted the authority of any official who requested the 
exclusion of any material being considered for publication, 
11+ he was urged·to contact the Office of Censorship at once. 
Following the issuance of these first two codes for 
the :prer>s and radio, By:r·on Price frequently emphasized the 
importance o:f complying with voluntary censorship. In April 
of 191+2 Price appeared before the American Society of News-
paper Editors and made the following statement, 
It is a happy circumstance that the President 
of the United States has put his confidence 
in your patriotism and your understanding, and 
has turned his back on those who agree that 
only eompulsory censorship can be effective. 
It will be an unhappy day for all of us i.f it 
is found that that confidence was misplaced, 
I personally do not believe that such a day 
will come. Whether it does is up to you,l:S 
13code· f th P (1 15 42) 3 ----~r --~' ress - - · , p. • 
p • lj.. 
i5Quoted in Robert E. Summers (comp,), Wartime 
Censorsh:ij: of' Pres.s and Radio (New Yorl<: H. W :-vrrrson 
Company, i942l, pp·;--yr.:)s:---
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A few weeks later Price stood before the .A.nnual Convention of 
the National Association of Broadcasters and said: 
• • , the success or failure of voluntary coop-
eration in broadcasting will depend upon the 
degree of control which patriotic broadcasters , 
exercise over the operation of their stations,16 
These emotional appeals, however, did not silence publishers 
and broadcasters. Criticism of censorship regulations and 
requests was :frequent and often hard--hitting. Many editors 
felt that the government used official censorship to cover 
up mistakes and to mislead the American public. 
War News Censored. News of the progression of the 
-~----, ... --~----~~c•-'•-
war was issued by the government and this allowed the govern·· 
ment to issue or withhold news at :its discretion. President 
Roosevelt, res:ponding to a reporter's query as to whether .or 
not the Office of Censorship should a1.1ow "bad" news to be 
printed in newspapers, replied: 
Bad news should be passed out obviously just 
as much as good news, just as soon as it 
doesn't affect military operations. 'l'here 
i.s only one reason for withholding bad news 
and th~:t i.s that it might affect military 17 operatlons and cause more bad news , , • • 
Many edi. tors and broadcasters charg(:>d the government wi. th 
providing an inaccurate picture of the war by withholding 
"bad news" until i"C could be balanced with the sirau1taneous 
16
cens.s>EEl'.it! PEess Releas~,...B.£.!_.Lf~, May 11, 1942, 
PP• 1-2. 
17From Franklin n. Hoosevelt, Press Conference, 
May 22, 1942, in Samuel I. Hosenman (comp.), The Public 
Papers and Addresses of .Franklin D. Hoosevelt-; 19lj:2\foT, 
\i~ewYoi~·rc;tis.rper ,;i1ifBi:~·oFhe1-::s ·rsU'G1Ts.he-rs ,-I95o), p. 251. 
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. j 8 
release of "good news." · In February of .191+2 the aircraft 
tender ;r:,a~]L was sunk by Japanese dive bombers near Java 
with the loss of seven hundred American 1:\.ves and thirty-two 
airplanes that were on board the ship. News of the loss was 
not released until April, more than thirty days after the 
;I:angle;y: had gone down. 19 
Time magazine also cr:i.ticized the delays in reporting 
war news t-o- t:he- A1nerican public & The Navy vvaited sixty-=fi ve 
days to announce the loss of three American cruisers ~·- the 
Quincy, the Vince1~nes, and the Astor.if.!: --- while 'the 
Australian Government waited only ten days to announce the 
loss of their cruiser, the Canb~!:E~· sunk in the saws action, 
'J:he U. S, losses were announced by the American Government 
only later with the news of the sinking of six. enemy ships 
in another action separated by both time and space f:cmn the 
U. S. losses. .1'i.me stated that ". • • long delays in 
announcing sinkings may not have always been justified by 
reasons of military security , . ," and that these delays 
and carefully considered joint releases of "good" and "bad" 
news gave the American people the wrong impression of the 
. 20 progress of the United States J.n the war. 
·1.B.,r lb. C 't' · 
,\o J r1 1c1.zes 
April 18, 1942, p. lJ. 
i9News story from "Editor and PubLisher," April 25, 
1942, p. 86, reprinted in Summers, .Cll?.!..-.~.:Lt .• , pp. Hl5-188; see 
also Jam(~fJ !Via.cGregor Burns, Roosevelt: 1'he Soldier of Freedom 
(New York: Harcourt Brace JovariovTci'Ii-;··fii.c-:·;-'T970T.- J:,-,-··22J;----
20"Wl·lat P · S ? · 9 1 i r1.ce • ecrecy." JHl:.':, November , ,.9 ·t2, 
PP• 61-62. 
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In some cases news of American losses was denied 
immediate publication even when that news was common 
knowledge, Hundreds of persons living on the Atlantic coast 
of Florida near Palm Beach", , , heard several explosions 
and saw flames at sea." 21 Quite obvious1y, a sea battle was 
in progress, later known to be between a. German U-boat and 
Allied ships. The battle began on a Saturday evening. By 
-------------t-he --next-- mo-rning- people v.rere driving view 
the upturned hulks of the incapacitated ships, and reporters 
were waiting to interview the Allied survivors as they 
scram1Jled ashore on the Florida beaches. The Navy refused to 
allow Florida papers to print any news or reference to the 
s:i.nkings. 1\iot until a full week after the first ship was 
~;unk, cmd only a:t'ter strong protests from editors and 
publishers, did the Navy release a news item covering the 
sinkings. In another case a British steamer was sunk by a 
German U-boat a few miles from Puerto Rico with the loss of 
many American lives. Even though the survivors were seen 
coming ashore at Puerto Rico, and even though the Canadian 
press re:ported the sinking, the U. S. Navy refused to allow 
publication of the story in the American press·for more than 
two days, and only then after preBsure was brought to bear on 
the Navy Department. 22 The Navy later apologized for the 
March 
21 Arthur Robb, editorial in "Editor and Publisher," 
17' 191<·?., ~6 . t d . s . 16 "'- p. · J , reprln e u1 ummers, .91!..!..-C.: :L 't. , p. . 9, 
22Editorial in "Editor and Publisher,,; January Jl, 
p. 22, reprinted in _ibid., pp. 1?'+--176. 
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"confusion" over the incident but included this admonition in 
its announcement: 
No newspaper or news service should publish 
any report or information of ships sunk or 
damaged by enemy action until such informa-
tion has been cleared for release • • • , 
even though the incident may be within the 
view of shore observers • , , ,23 
1'he wi thholrJ.ing of this and similar news items was justified, 
a_CC()J:'Cling_to_the Office of Censorship, because publication of 
a ship sinking, even though it is within sight of American 
beaches, would assist", .. an attacking commander ••. to 
gauge the effect of his fire. Enemy comma.nders should not be 
aided in this task. " 24 But this justification was difficult 
to accf.,pt in the face of further censorship efforts. Even 
when a fire broh:e out on an .Ame:cican ship in port in New York, 
with smoke ne . . billowing across Manhattan, to be seen by 
millions, , • 25" 11 . • " the Navy refused to a ow plctures of th,:: 
fire or the damaged ship to be tal~:en, and delayed publication 
of the story until New York editors and publishers raised a 
storm of protest. 26 !VIany persons, including some members of 
Congress, began publicly protesting governrnent efforts at 
news suppression, and the practice of "sugar-coating" bad 
p. J. 
2 3News story in "Editor and Publisher," January Jl., 
p. 71, reprinted in ibid., pp. l77-l7H. 
24c· h' I 1 6 4 ...:..~2.£.~ .. 2:1~ ... ,ress Re eas .. ~~~12· October 29, 19 2, 
2
.5vvalter E; Schneider, news story in "Editor and 
Publi:;;hcr," February 14, 19h2, p. 9, repr.i.nted in Smnmers, 
.9!'..!.-Cl ~, , p. 1H1. 
26
rbid., pp. 181.-182, 
L ____ _ 
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news. 27 Others expressed an opinion, widely held, that the 
government was providing only one side of the war news, 
thereby obscuring the seriousness of the war and promoting 
complacency while at the same time chastising the public and 
the news media for being complacent and apathetic. 28 Much of 
this censorship bungling could be traced directly to the over~ 
zealous efforts of military authod ties, The Of:flce of 
-censorshTt'l ,- i:uider- ihe leadership of' Byron Price, often denied 
the requests of military officials to suppress news in the 
domestic press. 29 
Not all military officials attempted to impose 
unwarranted censorship. Some, lilw General Douglas MacArthur, 
felt that it was "• • , essential that the public know the 
tr'u.-'t-.h ...• "JO n . ·t D . h t "". h t. tl .<<'mera. WJ.g ·. ~lfoen. ower, comJncn lng on 1e 
censorship of wa:~· news in the United States said, "I do not 
believe that speculation by self-styled military analysts 
in the homelands, far removed from a theater_of operations, 
is of any great benefit to the enemy ... 31 
27"Sugar Coating Assailed," New York Times, 
Februar'y 211-, 191+2, p. 18; see also "1\a:tr--·ui~ges!ilotto 
'Military Action,'" _tJe_Y.i_YO£k 1't!1_1~~~· Febr-uary 13, 19Lf2, p. 14. 
ZR...d'•- . 1-. "N y k .T. "M 25 194 ~.!:'~ J.vorla~ ln_ 1ew .or},. .J.mes. Nay , . 2-, 
repr·inted in Summers, o:e.:_ cit., pp. 225-:o27. 
1942, 
City: 
Z9News story in "United States News," February 6, 
p. 17, reprinted in J:-bid., p. 130. 
JOGeneral Doug:Las MacArthur, statement made on 
2J, 1942, (pioted in ibid., p. 1+1, 
JlDwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In EuroJ?e (Garden 
Double day & company, Inc.-, l949)-,-p.-·n:;9 . 
i 
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Racial conflicts censored. Eisenhqwer also related 
that military censors in England had denied correspondents 
the right to publish stories of racial conflicts between 
white and black American soldiers.32 The English, according 
to the General, most often accepted American Negro soldiers 
as equals, and Negro soldiers oftei1 dated white English girls. 
'.rhis, he said, often infuriated intolerant white American 
~------.---------s-o-ld-iers,--- and--resulted in frequent brawls:: The white G.I. 
was", •• further bewildered when he found that the British 
press toolc a firm stand on the side of the Negro ... 33 When 
Eisenhower revoked the censorship ban on stories of th.ese 
racial brawls he found that most American correspondents 
favored retention of tbe ban .in order to protect against 
IVIi:U tary censors in the United States also favon)d 
ba1ming or, when this was not possible, playing dOVv11 racial 
conflicts at home. On Apri.l 3, 1942, a race-riot broke out 
at Fort Dix, New Jersey. An argument between a white and et 
black soldier suddenly exploded into a small-scale battle. 
Nearly seventy-five soldiers, using rifles and pistols, 
conducted their O\'m limited war· for hours, resulting in thr,~e 
dead and several wounded.J4 'l'he Army, with support from the 
Offic" of Censorship, refused to allow publication of the 
·---·---
32Ib" 
_ld.' P• 58. 
33rb · d "9 
- _ _..?;_., P• :J I 
34"Armh Board Sifts Fort Di.x Shooting," New_X?rl~ 
April ~. 1942, p. 14. 
1 
6J 
story by radio broa.dcast.35 Newspapers b<?gan publishing news 
of the incident the following day,3 6 and the riot was soon 
general public Jmowledge, 37 Emphasizing that Axis propa-
gandists capitalized upon racial 
States,38 the Army described the 
difficulties in the United 
race-riot as " . . merely 
a brawl and without racial signifi'cance."39 This "brawl" 
that was without racial significance motivated the Army to 
:_, __ ,, -+-1~~ ~--.n,·-, .. -1-- -••"-+ ............... ,,_ ::.-·11-hJ .. -•. ~_': --"-:::L'rn __ -_._-_ i_-. _,_t. _"_•'ol·.t_·_ --------.A.;-1a~a~u..J~Cl.-vtJ-..... -y-- -~v.rti-;;...J:l.~ -... u y_ ...... t::.J.- ... ~:::J.:i::i c....:.:. _____ ....,,_.K_ • ':.":";::: ~.,,, ,., P 
Dix until completion of an inquiry into the disturbance. 
Referring to a similar black-white incident at a camp in 
Louisiana some months earlier, the Office of Censorship 
claimed that the Army had not acted without precedent w))en it 
banned radio broa.d-cast of the .Fort D.i.x incident. 40 
Norman Carlson, former Chief Postal Censor, justified 
the suppression of news of racial disturbances. Publicizing 
these disturbances aided the enemy, he said, by providing 
p. 4-8' 
35News story in "Broadcasting," April 13, 191+2, 
reprinted in Summers, _£p~_sit., pp. 19Lf-195· 
36 "Arrny Board Sifts For-t Dix Shooting," New Yorlr 
.2J2..:..~ c :i. t . --~--------
3 '~s umm c r s , .9J!..: ____ c: .!::!~ • _ 
38r·b. d 10 , . 
• ,;,w,,'~'-~~ Q ~ p t / ;J e 
39"Army Board Sifts F'ort Dix Shooting," _tl~_ew Yt?rk: 
~L!· 
Li·O,, 't 191 19 '- . . . l 
..,ummers, op, cJ. • , pp. ·f- :; . For addJ..tJ..ona. 
information on the -Fo·rt-Dix rl.ot and other incidents of 
ra.cial viol.enc.e durin/? the ,war ye;;rs, :;:e~ Burns, .2:12.,~ ... .02:.~., 
p. 388, and Hr~rvard SJ.tkoff, "Rac1al M1l1. tancy and Inter·-
racial Violence in the Second World War," The J·ournal o:f 
Am~rt_c:.§.!UJistory, I, VIII (December, 1971) , ·6-61-ti'BT:--·~----·-
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them with ammunition for their propaganda weapons. In 
addition to suppressing news of racial disturbances, or riots, 
Carlson justified Censorship's practice of deleting from 
citizens' mail all statements that adversely described 
political or social conditions in the United 
the war. Such letters were either incised or 
States during 
. lH J.mpounded. 
It would appear that the Offi.ce of.' Censorship during 
-- -- - -world. war r-r- concentrated on cover.ing up the symptoms or 
manifestations of racial turmoil rather than attacking the 
causes. Attempts to cover up these incidents merely provided 
fuel for Axis propagandists; if the government had done some-
thing to eliminate the causes of the tunnoil there could have 
'l'hat the 8ffice of Censon;;hi.p concurred i.n the 
snppression of nc,ws of racial dissension may be indicated by 
another case a year after the Fort Di.x disturbance. In April 
of 1911.3 British correspondent .Alex Faulkner, in a cable from 
the United Stat<;s to England, referred to Erskine Caldwell' f3 
novel, r~<:!.~.:.§..lct..:t.:.l].§ Ac_E:~. 'fhe reference was promptly deleted 
by cable censors, evoking this question from Faulkrlflr: "1'o 
win the war is it necessary to make the people of England 
think that there are no depressed economic groups and no race 
. . 42 problems J.n the UnJ.ted States?" The answer must have been 
41B d l . t . '+h C J ase on persona. l.n ervJ.ew Wl" Norman ar .son, . 
January 11, 1972. 
4
·
2Alex Faulkner, "How Tough is American Censorship?" 
Harper~, April, 1943, pp. 502-509; quotation on p. 502. 
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"Yes," for his very question was eliminated from his cable by 
the censors! Faulkner also reported that in February of 1943 
the following anecdote was deleted by censors from a jour-
nalist's story: "Washington tells a story , of a clerk 
who substituted for his own portrait on his War Department 
identity badge that of Adolf Hitler, and wore it unchallenged 
leJ for a weel\.," Faulkner apparently f'el t tllat the Office of 
Ceru30l's1tip-- -ha-d -not- lived up to Byron P-rice • s guarantee that 
"Nobody shall ever be censored, or censured, for attacking a 
44· censor." 
issued by the Of:lice o:f Censorship raised additional storms 
of protest, espe0ially those regulations restricting tile 
~'epor·r.in£; of we8 .. l-her news by the press a.nd radio, 1'he Office 
of Censorship had requested that newspaper editors print only 
those weather forecasts officially released by the Weather 
Bureau. 45 Even more restrictive was the request that radio 
stations carry no weather forecasts at all, except in cases 
of emergency. 46 Thus, if it was snowing outside, the local 
radio station would have to disregard it entirely, while 
local papers could report -che snow only aftccr receiving per-
mission from the Weather Bureau or the Office of Censorship. 
These restrictions led to some rather ludicrous situations. 
On Easter Sunday in 1942 a serious snowstorm blanketed much 
of the Eastern United States. The snow:fall in New·York was 
66 
heavy, but in Washington, D.C. it was even heavier. 1'he New 
York Times published a story of a huge traffic tie-up in Wash-
ington due to the snowstorm there; Censorship regulations 
ret:tricted weather news in any one paper to a radius of' one 
_______ h:undred.fifty miles of the city in which the paper was pub-
Lf7 lished. Theref'ore, because the New.Jor_l.::__ Times. had printed 
a story rela.ted to the snowfall in Washington, D .c, , it could 
not on the same day print any news about the snowfall in its 
own city •. Some newspapers, with the approval of the Office 
of' Censorship, published pictures of the snowfall without an 
explanatory by--line, Newspa:per editors were even advised by 
Ctonsorship officials not to print the traditioi1al "ground-
hog" predictions of the coming of' spring. One radio sports-· 
caster, doing his best to abide by censorship regulations, 
announced, during a late autcunn football game, that he could 
not see the players on the field. He judiciously withheld 
the reason and his listeners had to determine for themselves 
if it was rain, snow, or fog that was covering the playing 
. l ItS f1.e .d. · In March of 1942 the Office of Censorship wi·thheld, 
for a number of hours, news of a serious tornado which 
47co_ci~~r:_Press, (l-15-'+2), p. J. 
48For weather stories see Theodore Koop, !e_<l.:£?.ll.2!~ 
§.;;U:~nce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 191}6) , 
pp. T0?-108. 
,~ ,~ 
0( 
extended over three southern states and claimed 125 lives. 4·9 
In some cases if a radio station located two hundred miles 
from the center of a storm received permission to report news 
of that storm, then the local radio station at the storm 
center could not report the storm to its listeners.5° The 
reason given for these restrictions was to deny aid and 
comfort to the enemy, but there were those who felt that the 
---------
phrase wa~s being given " •• an exaggerated meaning to hide 
incompetence,"5l 
The phrase "aid and comfort" was used frequently to 
suppress news articles. One issue of Time_ required modiJJ. .. 
cation at the request of.the Office of Censorship because it 
carried '" story of the treatment of dysentery by a sulfa 
·~2 drug,-·· 1'h.e Gto:cy was eliminated because the Office of 
Cem>ot'ship :frol t it would give aid and comfort to the enemy, 53 
Censorship was going to get worse before it got better. 
Total war: the "Official Secrets Bill." 1'here were 
---- .. ,~-----
those persons, including journalists, who supported even 
4
·9News story i.n "Variety," March 25, 19Lf2, p, 25, 
reprinted.in Summers,£~ cit,, pp, 197-199. 
5° News . story in "Variety," May 20, J. 9~·2, p. 37, 
reprinted in iJ;lj.d., p. 199. 
51 
·'Editorial by· David lawrence in "United States 
News," .!"'arch 13, 19'4·2, pp, 22-·J, reprinted in ibid., pp. 
215--216. . . ---
the 
5') 
'""Another Sulfa Drug," 'J.'ime, f.\ay It, 19'+2, p, 32; 
story was eJ.iminated from export editions of this issue. 
53 .. :r:i.me, Inc." (house organ) , May 18, 19'·f2, reprinted 
in Summers, ££.:_ci::_t_., pp. 216-219. 
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stricter censorship, in peace as well as ~n war. 54 Noted 
joun1alist and writer William L. Shirer advocated the 
suppression of the American fascist press because he felt its 
philosophy was a hazard to freedom. 55 'I' he Director of the 
Office of Facts and Figures, Archibald MacLeish, criticized 
a "minority" of newspaper editors ·for their "defeatist" 
I attitudes toward the war policies of the administration,56 
L ____ . _____ "T;:~ ___ ,,.._.:; _, __ ..l.-_t.,..._,.i.., ___ -k'l.-.~ __ -P-._~ ....... ..: __ .-._-1- ""'""',...., ..... .-.. no .... r:l r.+'hoV>co o"nrr<::~cr~~ in 
Jlt:! ;:;;<:J.,.J..U l_,llQ.l.o l.dlt.:: ...lCl.OI..-.J..Ul• .1:-".L'-'0~~ O.~.tU. VV.IJ.'-"'J..IJf ._.,'"b'""b....-....,. _ .... 
"defeatist propaganda" rather than "democratic criticism ... 5? 
"Fascist" and "defeatist" were phrases frequently used during 
the war to describe newspapers, magazines -·· and people 
that were critical of the Roosevelt administrations. 
In .1\.prU of 19/.j-1 President Roosevelt offered this 
public st.atern.ent concerning censorship: 
Suppression of opinion and censorship of 
news are among the mortal we2.pons that 
dictatorships direct against their own 
people and against the world. As far as 
I am concerned there will be no govern-· 
ment control of news unless ~t be of 
vital military information.5 
Roosevelt's public statements, however, were not always the 
same as his private ones. In a private letter to Winston 
5'~ Rel'.£.rt on the Q_f.fic..§__q.f_~-~.£1?hip, pp, J2- JJ. 
55william Shirer, "Poison Pen," Atlantic, May, 19/.j·2, 
pp. 548-552; an opposing view is D. Pontius·~Treedom for the 
fascist press?" )_~_Repul?"1·i~, September 7, 1942, p. 287. 
56"Defeatist Press," New York Til~, April 18, 191+2, 
p. lJ. 
57 Ibid' 
)8 
· Quoted in Koop, .212..~-'='it. , p, 1.6J. 
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Churchill a year later he said that "• , that delightful 
god , , . the freedom of the Press , . , ," did not always 
l h . h 59 rna {e J.m appy. He told Churchill he felt he was being 
. . • menaced by , so-called interpretive comment by a " . . 
handful or two of gentlemen who cannot get politics out of 
their heads in the worst crisis, who have little background 
and lcsG lmowledge, and who undertake to lead public opinion 
-o-n- tha-t--- bas-i-s--e-''--- -T-he--- President was understandably concE!rnod 
with the war and the ever-changeable world situation, and he 
complained that "My own press -·- the worst of it -- are 
persistently magnifying relatively unimportant domestic 
matters • • • • "60 
Perhaps Roosevelt' 13 senUmen t:s were best expressed 
early in 1911.;~ v1han an adm.inistration--backed "Wsx Secrets Bill" 
was presented to Congress, 1'he bill was prepared in the 
Department of Justice and introduced by Democratic Represen-
tative Hatton w. Summers of Texas. 61 The proposed bill would 
have made it a criminal offense to ". • • communicate, 
divulge or publish to any person, in whole or in }Jart, copies 
of the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of 
any file, instrurnent, letter, memorandum, book, pamphlet, 
59 Quoted in "Winston S, Chu:r.·chill, ~~he Socond World 
war, VoL IV, 'J:he H~ of Fa to (Boston: Ho.ugi1t-ori!vi:LYITii1~ 
19.')0), P• 200.--- ----
60 . Ib.1.d. 
61Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971; see also 
David Hinshaw, The. Home Front (New York: G, P. 11 utnam' s Sons, 
194 J) ' p • 1 J 3 ' ··------·---···---
paper, docnment, manuscript, map, picture, plan, record or 
other writing . ' ," declared secret or confidential by any 
62 department·of the government. 
~rhe attempt by the administration, through Attorney 
General Francis Biddle, to push through this bill elicited 
70 
immediate and heated protest from the press. The War Secrets 
Bill was felt by many to be an effort to suppress any infor-
-- ----mation that--any---government official considered confidential. 
A war measure aimed at spies, the bill was, nevertheless, in 
permanent fol.'rrl, Hatton Summers, then Chairman oi' the House 
Judiciary Committee said, when he introduced the bill, 
I want to protect essential secrets 
from being· disclosed to the enemy, 
but I W[o\lTI; also to protect the people 
of ·chis democracy in the opportunity 
to k:rww tli8 things they. ought to know 
in order to govern it.15J 
Some felt the administration was trying to shift to compul-
sory and unlimited (either in scope or time) censorship. One 
news magazine cautioned that the bill would protect the 
mi.l:i tar;v· .from civilian advice 1 supervision, and critic ism. 
nr_r•:his is censorship at 
means that part of the 
the source," said the 
truth is withheld." 64 
article. "It 
One paper 
called the proposed bill "Gestapo legislation • ., 65 Another 
ll'larch 
62
"Gag Bill," Ti!~• March 2, 1942, pp. J8-.J9. 
63Quoted in Hinshaw, op. cit. 
64
"1'hreat to Freedom of Press?" .Q_ni·t~_i_§.!~~~J:!~_ws 1 
6, 1942, pp. 1)-14. . 
65"0fficia1 Secrets Bill: Widespread Press 
Oprosi'tion," Q_n1:t.~.!.L.§_tate~_NE':J!:?.• l\'larch 6, 19Lf2, p. 21. 
71 
said the bill " , • would give every burE?au and bureaucrat 
in Washington blanket authority to conceal from the public 
any bit of' information it or he deemed it inexpedient for the 
public to have." "It would permit the Executive Department 
to suppress public controversy about its a.cts, " 66 Attorney 
General Biddle sought a formal opinion from Byron Price. 'l'he 
Director of the Office of' Censorship replied that he did not 
------.---------J:lke- the wording---- of- -t-he- bill~ which p he felt t was aimed 
partly at publication, He felt the bill amounted to compul-
. d ... 1 ! . 67 sory censorshlp and an en .. o vo untary censors u.p. Price 
'wrote Biddle that " passage of the bill in its present 
f 1 t b . t t. 1 . t 68 orm wou d no· e J.n he na 1ona J.nteres ·." The Director 
of Censorship rmwt have let his sentiments be known because 
Time report-od_ ·th.::tt Price II e 
bill as little af; anybody," 69 
to his credit • • • liked the 
After scathing criticism by the press the .A.dminis-
tration disavowed its support --· even its !mow ledge. -- of the 
bilL 70 The "Official Secrets Bill," or "War Secrets Bill," 
as it was variously called, " , , was allowed to die 
peacefully in committee ... 71 
66
rbid, 
67Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971. 
68Ibid. 
69 . 
"Gag Blll," Tim'!)_, March 2, 191+2, p. 38. 
70"0f'ficia.l Secrets Bill: Widespread Prero;~; 
Opposition;" _llni!~!L_States__li__~~;~• !Viarch 6, 1942, p. 2L 
'11Byron Price to writer, December 20, 1971. 
J>iml..i~m~IJ.istra ti ve 
Adm:i.nif;tration could not legislate 
censorshiP.• If the 
. 72 compulsory censorshlp, 
72 
it could suppress criticism and unpopular opinions by other 
legal mean.s. Byron Price, in his capacity as Director of the 
Office of Censorship, stated that his office would not 
attempt to censor the government.73 Under the concept of 
I "appropriate authority" any government official could release 
l_ ____ --information without first consulting the Office of CensorE;hip, 
This concept of "appropriate authority" also applied to 
members of Congress. Congressmen and Senators, when speaking 
on the floor of either chamber, were immune from censorBhip 
regulations and their remarks were printed regularly in the 
.CO~"!;e;res§_i~S1:.1. Rec,_ci_}'d. The solons did not always limit their 
remarks to the floor of CongreBs, however. In fact, they 
spoke so freely, and in what many felt to be in violation of 
censorship regulations, that they became knovm as the "531 
holes in Byron's Code •• 74 
Although the Office of Censorship did not pro:pose to 
censor the government, the.government intended to censor 
itself. Before the war many Federal agencies provided 
printGd .information as a service to any and all who requested 
that in;format.ion. In ,J1me, 19~'2, Pred.dent Roosevelt issued 
72It should be remembered that tJ-w Office of 
Censorship did not have the power of legislation, but 
functioned by Executive Order. 
7J&:P_C?.JZLon t[l~_Q_ffic~ of_g_~nsoy_Eh1.p, p. 32. 
74t\obcert Humphreys, "How Your News is Censored," 
_!2.§-tUE_clay Ev~~l_"l__i_I2fLE_ost, Septembf.'r 26, 1942, p. 114. 
7J 
~m Executive Order that authoriz,ed the Office of War Infor-
mation75 ", , , to require the curtailment or elimination of 
any Federal information service, program, or release •• , 
not directly related to the prosecution of the war eff'ort ... 76 
By October of 1942 the Office of War Information had with-
dravm from or drastically reduced the circulation of more 
:r·epresented 
Elmer Davis, 
then Director of the Office of War Information, said that his 
office did not want to censor any government official. But 
the wording of Davis's statement certainly gives some 
indication of how the Administration felt about federal 
officials talking tti reporters: 
If some official disagrees with a 
policy that has been a.greed on and 
adoiYtt'ld, there is nothing to pre-
vent him from expressing such dis-
agreement to reporters -·- nothing 
e~ce~~ his ~udgment and sense of 
pxopr.J.ety. 7 
~:here was ". • , no law reg.ui.ring compliance with the 
requests of the Office of Censorship, and there [was] no 
75Established by Executive Order 9182 on June 1J, 
19IJ·2, the Office of War Information consolidated and 
replaced the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of 
Government Reports, the Coordinator of Information, and the 
Division of the Emergency Managemc;nt Office (7FR4468-69). 
'7 6Elmer Davis and Byron Price, War Information and 
fell!?_?!:si:.tr.. · ( Wa9hi.ngton, D. C • : American-·c 6uncflon-P-ubh c-
Affa1rs, L194J]), p. 17. 
'17 Il:JJ:.0. • • P • 25 • 
?8 Ibj~~l· , p. 21+. 
penalty for violations .. 79 However, when an editor or • • • 
broadcaster refused to heed the requests of the Office of 
Censorship, that editor or broadcaster might receive a letter 
from the Office of Censorship calling attention to his 
"error." A flagrant violation of censorship regulations or 
requests might elicit a public statement from the Office of 
Censorship naming the radio station or newspaper in violation. 
------------..ltn- edi-tor--- or-- broadcaster .who persisted in violating voluntary 
censorship guidelines could be prosecuted under the Espionage 
Act of 1917 or the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1918. 
The Federal Gove:cnrnent could rely on various ways 
for punishing editors who disregarded the requests of the 
voluntary codes. ·washington correspondents might have the:tr 
welcome withdrawn at official press conferences, or receive 
a cold shoulder when they sought 6fficial information. 
Government agend.es could "neglect" to send press releases to 
certain publicati.ons, or even 'resort to public condemnation 
of a paper defying the code. Wide publicity of such public 
condemnation would not set well with competitors, advertisers, 
Or re. ad.e~s, 8° F' · J J 'l l,_ th t ·  . lna _ -Y, ·c 1ere was one o·;,1er · rea enJ.ng 
aspect always held in abeyaneroJ ··- compulsory censorsh.ip if 
voluntary censorship proved ineffective •81 
p. 2. 
80
zechariah Chafee, Jr., Govermnent and lViass 
goi]!Jl'.!!l2~l_C'0\~}ons, Vol. I (Chicago: UnTve1-\slty a·rciiiCago 
Press, 191+7J.p, lf59· · 
81-Lb' d J 60 
.:.....1:._ • • p • + • 
I 
75 
'rhe government could also use its ovm departments to 
punish those who opposed administration policies. The most 
favored method was to instruct the Post Office Department to 
suspend the mailing privileges of uncooperative publica.tions. 
In regards to radio stations, ", .• the Federal Communi-
cations Commission had the power of license . , , .,82 John 
Fetzer, formerly Chief Radio Censor in the Office of Censor-
s-n-ip~ --st_ated-- that-he did n. 8 • not recall that any station 
was removed from the air .,83 Byron Price, however, . . ' 
admitted that a "cov.ple of broadcasters" were removed from 
th . f 1 d . b . 84 e aJ_r or n ~ • , open y sprea ~ng su vers1on , , . . " 
Keep re1iorted that in two cases Price contacted radio station 
managers and requested that certain foreign-language broad-· 
casters, one Gen.nan and one Italian, be removed from the air 
fo:c questionable activities; the request was complied with. 85 
A.~9.~.§0Cl_~L..;jJAstJc.2.. The government was most 
active when silencing critical newspapers or writers. One 
free--lance writer was convicted of violating the Espionage 
Act of 191'7 for his written attacks on President Roosevelt, 
the English, and the Jews, and for advocating a German 
victory in World War II. 86 There were a m1mber of sim.i.lar 
82 Byron Price to writer, November 
83J·ohn Fetzer to writer, November 
84Byron Price to writer, November 
85Koop, E:e..: cit., p. 181·!·, 
86
chafee, 2l2_:_ci t. , pp. 4 50-451. 
8, 1971. 
18, 1971.. 
8, 1971. 
l 
cases. 87 Very early in the war the Post Office delayed an 
entire issue of the Townsend Nat~onal .. weekly because of an 
t . t d"t . 1 88 an ~-governmen e ~ or~a • 
The most"notable instance of official suppression of 
editorial opinion occurred in early 191-1-2 when the Federal 
Government, through the Post Office and J'ustice Departments, 
Sodal 
·---~-· 
Jus~!ge, a -weekly -newspaper, first s.ppeared on March 1J, 
It was utilized by Father Charles Coughlin, the "radio 
priest," for his anti--government campaigns. Severely anti-
Roosevelt, §..££.~~cT~_!ice, in its October 21, 19/t-0 iBsue, 
advocated the impeachment of the President because of hif; 
transfer of military aircraft to Great Britain, and becmwe 
of' his friendshiy toward RU:ssia. 89 Coughlin, an Irish 
Catholic priest, had little love for the British, and accused 
Roosevelt of" .•• loving Great Britain more than the United 
States. ,.90 
In March of 1941 the Army banned Soc_:i,_:?.LJ.:~w!l£:£ from 
its military posts. The Army offered no official explanation 
for its action. S<!,.cia,l..l_usti~, in its Anglophobic and anti-· 
Semitic wrath, responded by saying Americans were becomine; 
-----·---· 
194 2 • 
(New 
87].:bJ __ (L, P• 450, n. 15. 
88E'd. t . J . ". ' 1 l: .. orl.a. _ l.n "Eu~ tor and PublJ.sher," J.anuary 2 ¥, 
p. 26, reprinted in Summers, _2~cic!•• p. 164 • 
. . 
89charles J, .Tu~l •. !~a,th~F_Cough}-~~a,r:~<,t_i_:)1e New__QE;a~ 
Y.ork: Syracuse Um.vers1.tyPress, .965), p.-22). 
9°Quoted in ibid., p. 226. 
I I __ 
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" • • • a mesmerized people -- mesmerized by British gold and 
Jewish propaganda ... 91 
Social Justi_ce characterized Roosevelt as a radical, 
a crack .. pot, and an un-American dictator. The anti-Semi tic 
nature of Social Justice was certainly not disguised. In 
September of 1.94-1 the paper showed its racial hatred when :L t 
commented on whs.t it felt to be the ls.rge number of pro .. war 
Jews in the Rc)osevel i Administration: 
The Jew should retire from the field 
of politics and government. He has 
no more business in that sphere than 
has a pig in a china shop.'12 
Social Justice blamed Roosevelt for the Pearl Harbor attack 
even more than it ·blamed ,Jap8.n 1 and in March of 191+2 the 
pa}'·~l~ accused th'J ,Tev.rs of starting World War II, 93 
irritation. He often sent samples of the paper to Attorney 
General Francis Biddle with comments like, "What are you 
doing to stop this?"94 In April of 194·2 Biddle, at the 
urging of the President, began the crack-dova1 on Social 
Justic.::, Biddle fir·st directed Postmaster General Frank 
Walker to "suspend or revoke" the second-class mailing privi-
leges of the paper under the authority of the Espionage Act 
of' 191?. 'l'h~) Attorney general then sent an emissary to 
91Quoted 
92 Ib~d. , 
93r·b·. 1 
.:..-..2:£. ~ f 
94Quoted 
in ibid,, p. 228. 
p. 229. 
PP• 230-233· 
in i:PJ.d., p. 23~. 
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Archbishop Mooney of Detroit, who ordered F'ather Coughlin to 
divorce himself from all relationship to .~ocial Justice, and 
to ", , , cease all public pronouncements for the duration of 
the war under penalty of defrockment." F'ather Coughlin 
complied completely, choosing the priesthood over a secular 
career,95 
i ties from continuing the crack-dovn.1. unti1 .§_ociJ\ct .. ;c1.2'.f::lt~~!.:l .. • 
its mailing privileges revoked, its public sale and distri-
bution denied, and its owners threatened with prosecution for 
sedition, folded'· never to be printed again, 97 Three other 
publications were,. subsequently denied mailing privileges for 
cri tid. zing the administr-ation, aligning themselves with Axis 
opinion, criticizing Great Britain, creating racial hatred, 
or reprinting articles from Social Justic!.9 8 
According to New Regub}.).c, 'by October of 1942 nearly 
forty magazines had their mailing privileges revoked by the 
Post Office Department.99 One New York newspaper which con-
tained racing information (which the government felt could be 
9 5rb • ' 
.:!:_ • .:~9: " ' 
96Ibiq., 
pp. 234·-235 • 
p. 2J6. 
97 Chafec , .S!.l'c..! ..... EL~. , p. J20. 
98News stor~v ill "Editor and Publisher," May 
p. 6, reprinted in Summers, ~cit., pp. 165-166. 
three publica t:Lons wen' the (Philadelphia) Herold, 
(Mi.mc:i.e) ~-·P:_<'::i• and the (Wichita) J::~blici t~-.-· --
99chafec, 912..:._ ... 2-Ll· 
9, 1942, 
These 
the 
79 
an open code) was taken off the streets on the advice of the 
Office of Censorship. 
No evidence is yet available that would indicate the 
total number of publications that were suppressed by the 
government during the war. The reference above says thel"fJ 
were forty such incidents before the war was a year olcL 
Byron Price said he would not have thought there had beer< 
- -~- _1_f\() j----- -th8:t many • ~ v v 
, was handled by 
Prol)ably the majority of these suppressirxr1<J 
the Post Office Department under its regu-· 
lations against the mailing of seditious materiaL "In some 
cases Censorship was consulted, in others it was not," 101 
Byron Price said that the Office of Censorship ". . • never 
interfered in any manner with editorial opinion and it was a 
cardinal policy never to take notice of criticism of the 
government," 102 
The _Mo:J,_oto.:.:_ __ gto:sY,. As explained above, one of the 
ways in which the Office of Censorship could· punish a paper 
for non-compliance with censorship requests was to publicly 
identify and criti.cize.that paper for its disobedience. 
In late !Viay of 191+2 the Office of Censorship was 
informed that Russian l<oreign Commisf>ar V. M. Molotov would 
soon visit the United States. The State Depal"tment wanted to 
insure that there would be no advance reporting of this 
100Byron Price to writer, December 20, l971. 
101Ibid. 
102Byron Price to writer, November B, 1971. 
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diplomatic visit. The Office of Censorship assured "the State 
Department that the censorship codes requested that editors 
and broadcasters withhold news of any diplomatic mission 
illltil specific pennission 
received from appropriate 
to publish such 
. 103 
authority. 
information was 
The Office of Censorship notified editors and broad-
casters that a "Russian Diplomat" would v:tsit the United 
---- ------ - -------- -- -- ----- --- --- -- -States very soon, -and they were to refl"ain from mentioning 
t] . . . . ' 104 l~s upcom1ng v1s1o. All radio stations and new:c;papers 
complied with this request-- except one. During Molotov's 
visit to the United States105 the Philade:J.:£b.t§l_Q<3.i£L New~. 
printed, ", . . . h tt l 12 ,.106 li1 a c a ··y co .. umn on page • • • , a 
single sentcmce which read, 
~t'he talk i.n official Russi8.n circles 
here is that v. M. Molotov oJ Soviet 
Russia is in this country on a seeret 
mission of vast importance.107 
The revealed item went largely unnoticed and Molotov ended 
his "secret" twelve-day visit on June H, 1942. On June 12 
Byron Price released a report of the visit to the radio and 
the press. In this release he congratulated the cooperative 
·o~ . ~)Code for Broadcasters (1-15-42), p. 4; see also 
£ode .J:2.r'-tl:!£_J~Xe8E ·-n:Ts-IT2!7'P. I+ • 
104Koop, ~!_.S:it .. , p. 220. 
iO "'" l t ' d t th W". ' }! 29 -h,o .. o ov arr1ve a e .. l·Ge ouse on May . ; see 
~::.r: _ _._ __ c,:j,_! • ' p • 2 J 2 • llurns, 
106Koop, .£E• cit. 
1942, 
lO? Q.u.otecl in "What Sense Censorship?" 'fJ.mH, June 22, 
pp. 58~ .. 60; quotation on p. 60. . 
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media for withholding news of Molotov's visit. 'l'he Phila-
---
del)2hi?- Daily_News was not going to be ignored, however, and 
Price concluded his press release with this paragraph: 
The one newspaper in which the story 
was published was the Philadelphia 
Daily News [sic], The publisher of 
the Daily.News [sic] has assured us 
that the Code was not violated inten-
tionally, but so far he has made no 
satisfactory explanation of the lOS 
manner in which the error occurred. · 
By publicly naming the paper that "violated" the code, Price 
tried to bring odium upon the Ph~,,lad~!.1!l:!iaJ2.ai1~::_l:!ey!E; as 
punishment, 
But this publisher's "error" had not received national 
coverage and, as it turned out, the Office of Censorship had 
little cause to ·worry about 'the indiscretion of the paper, 
At the same time that Molotov was visiting tho White House 
the Duke and Duchess of Windsor dropped in for a visit with 
the President. Time magazine reported that", • while 
photographers waited at the Vlhi te Iiouse to catch the Duke and 
Duche,:;s, . • • Molotov strolled slowly past them and not a 
camera clicked ... l09 This Time article went further and criti-
cized the press blackout of the Molotov visit. The blackout 
was, said ~t~l.E".• made a't the request of the Russian Government 
in order to keep secret from the American people the fact an 
agreement brctween the U o S, and the U. S. S. R, was pending o 
108 . _9eJ~<_£_()..£St£l-!._j'r_~s§. Re le§l.£~ . .1:!.£L .. .31• June 12, l91i-2. 
p. 60. 
l09"VIhat Sense Censorshii;'t" 21-1!1!:.• June 22, 191+2, 
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This, said Time, ". , , was a case of political, not military, 
censorship. "110 1'ime thus dulled the edge of Censorship's 
blade in this battle of the war on words. 
Reinforcements: The Revised Codes 
----
On June 15, 1942 the voluntary censorship codes for 
th d . . d l . d ll.l e press an racl~o were rev~se . anc re~ssue , These new 
! ___ --editions .were .expanded and revised to meet the needs of· cen-
sorship that had arisen since the first codes had been issued 
in January. Most sections of the new codes were strengthened 
or made more restrictivet 
In the Code for Broadcasters the restrictions on 
-----------------·-~-
we2,ther data were made almost all-inclusive, Radio stations 
were requested teo keep off the air "all weather data, eith0r 
forecasts, sununarhls, recapi tulatior,s, or any details of 
weather conditions," 112 'rhe only exceptions involved emer-
gency aru10uncements, such as floods, but even these emer-
gency announcements could", , • contain no reference to 
weather conditions,"ll3 Byron Price, an-ticipating evasion of 
1iOibid. 
111u, S, Office of Censor,~hip, Code of Wartime 
Prac-tices for American Broadcasters, E·oTl:To:n of'~Jurie~-15, 1942 
T\Va-shlngton--;J:J:cr:·:-u.-s. Governrneiil Printing Off ice) , 1942 ~ 
hereafter refel:red to as Code for Broadcasters ( 6--15-4-2); see 
also u. s. Office of censo1·shrr;·; Coctc?o1.,w~i:rtl.me Practices 
for the American Press, Edition o:C:Jun-e-T_5':··-197-fTl1Tash.fngton, 
D.c-:-:- u. s·:- Gov'm'11n1e!1t Printing Office), l9i+2j hereaHer 
n>fon·ed to as _Qod~ fo~ the -~~!?.:!2.5. ( 6-15-.h2). 
112 Co9:.§':.. . .!.?I Broacl.caste~_§_ ( 6--15-42), p. 2. 
l13Il .. , )J.Cot~~ p. J. 
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these rules, said that these weather restrictions also 
applied tq the "wisecracldng announcer" who says, on a rainy 
morning, "Where is that record 'Get Out Your Old Umbrella."' 
This revelation, according to Price, constituted a "dangerous 
disclosure." 114 
Other sections covering troops, ships, fortifications, 
industrial production, communications, and unconfirmed 
1----- -reports or rumors-were restated and clarified. This new 
I 
I 
edition of the radio code included a newly expanded section 
covering restrictions on radio coverage of air attacks on the 
United States. 11 5 Before an air raid began broadcasters (and 
publishers) were asked to give no warning of' the impending 
raid unltesB author:\.zed by the Army Defense Command, After a 
raid began broadcasters (and publishers) wen' asked to give 
no information beyond the bare fact that a raid had brJgun 
and that local defense forces had .gone into action. After a 
raid was over broadcasters (and publishers) could release 
stories about the raid if they did not include 
(1) horror or sensationalism, 
p. 2. 
(2) unconfirmed versions or reports, 
(3) any estimate of the number of planes 
involved or the number of bombs dropped, 
( 4) reference to damage, 
( 5) 
( 6) 
information as to the exact routes 
taken by enemy planes, or 
116 
counter-measures of defense. 
The caveat concludes that "Nothing in this request is 
intended to prevent· or curtail constructive reporting • . • 
of such matters as feats of heroism, incidents of personal 
courage, or response to duty by the military or cd.vilia:n 
------- -- ----- --------- __ 11 ''-defense workers,"~~' Any ·reporter trying to describe an a:Lr 
attack under these restrictions would be putting his journa-
listic ability to the acid test. Broadcasters were to give 
no information, even after an attack, concerning damage, the 
area attacked, or the number of planes involved. One editor 
asked if the enerrly would not lmow how many planes it had 
sent! 118 Concerning the restriction against describing the 
rout('S of planes in the attack, Price suggested that some-
thing similar to "over the Los Angeles area" be used.. 119 All 
radio stations in the area of the attack would "• •• operate 
or not operate at the direction of the Army Defcmse 
C d "120 omman .• .Apparently the .Army would ])8 in the best 
position to determine wha.t information would or would not aid 
the enemy in the event of an air attack, .According to Byron 
116.(b' . 
. -J.d. 
11'1-[b'd 
. l • 
118Koop, 2E-·-~~t., p. 198. 
119c h' P R 1 
... ensors !2:1?. ress e ease No. 8, February 25, 1942 . 
P• J. 
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Price, "It could even be argued with force that the broad-
casting of time signals might give information to the enemy. 
All his clocks and watches might have stopped!" 121 
Balloons and bombs. 'l'he air attacks provided for in 
this edition of the codes never came, But there were attacl~:s 
on the continental United States, both by sea and by air. 
The first of these attacks came on February 22, 1942, when a 
Japanese submarine surfaced off the coast of Santa Barbara, 
California, and shelled a ranch, with no casualties and 
little damage, 122 
In late 19Lfl+ t.he Japanese began launching bomb-
carrying paper balloons towards the United States. These 
balloons, about thirty feet in diameter and carrying a thirty 
pc>v.nd explord.ve dE)Vice, were launched from Japan to ride on 
natural air currents to the United States where the changes 
in air temperature and current over land would allow the 
-balloons, with their small bombs attached, to descend. 'I he 
first of these floating bombs was found at San Pedro, Cali-
fornia on November 11, 1944. 123 Other bomb-laden balloons 
were found in Montana, Cana.da, Wyoming, Ws.shington, Oregon, 
121Q<o'11:'.3_9.rsh~i..E...J're ~§__Re ::l.e ?~e N ~_1 B, l\'lay 11, 191+2. 
122B 't 21~ . urns, .£P. Cl ·. , p. . .. J, Koop says the date was 
February 23, and that the shells hit a.n oil field; see Koop, 
~cit., p. 196. 
. 
123Koop, .O..B.:_ci:t_., pp. 198-199; seE:: also Richard R. 
Llngeman, Don't You Know 1'here 's A War On? 'l'he American Home 
Front, 194T.:T91J: 5 (New ·rai:k: ·c.r:-- P. -Fulnam • ;,--r:>ons-;--I9';~crr-, P-IJ :·---)!+- )_,....----· ------ . . J ' 
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d f . E' t M' h' 124 an as ar as as 1c 1gan. In each d.iscovery the govern-
ment, either through the F. B. I., the Office of Censorship, 
or through military authorities, tried to suppress news of 
these balloon-bomb landings. Some newspapers serving areas 
where balloon-bombs were discovered, however, were able to 
print some short-lived stories of the bombs, which caused 
some shol't-li ved excitement. Byron Price subsequently desig-
--na.te-d th~e-war-Department as appropriate authority for the 
release of information of' these "enemy attacks," The Office 
of Censorship requested that editors and publishers not aid 
the enemy by printing news stories about the balloons. 
On May .5, 1945, a group of Sw1day School children on a 
church picnic in Oregon found a "white object" on the ground, 
One of the child.J:·en picked up the object and it exploded. 
Five ·childnen and one adult woman were Jdlled. 'rhe "white 
object" turned out to be one of the bombs carried by a 
Japanese balloon, The news of these deaths, the only ones 
ever reported resulting from these bomb-laden balloons, 
spread rapidly among Oregonians. The press clamored for 
permission to release the story. A consultation between 
Censorship and military authorities detco:rmined that release 
of the s'to:cy would cause panic in the United States, and g:i.ve 
aid and information to Japan, possiblybringing more balloons. 
The media were di.rectc<d to withhold all reference to bombs, 
balloons, Japan, or military interest in the Oregon d"aths, 
124 . . 
At least one of these balloons may have drifted as 
far East as Maryland; see Lingeman, .2Jl....!.......9_i t .• , p. 9>, 
----
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which were then reported as caused by an "· • , explosion 
from an undetermined cause • • • ,125 
However, Oregon officials and others warned that 
school children would soon be going into the woods as summer 
was rapidly approaching. Something had to be done to protect 
these children. The Army decided that it woudl begin an 
educational campaign in the schools West of the Mississippi. 
-- -- --------- ---- --
------ -- --- -
Very soon primary school children were admonished not to go 
near any unusual objects in the woods or on the beaches, and 
not to touch any white or brightly colored. "balloons" they 
might find. This program created much confusion and some 
panic. Many parents wanted to know what their children were 
being warned about. And the newspavers wanted to know why 
thGy eould not print information that thirty million school 
children were in possession of. As a result of this con-
fusion, the press and radio were allowed to print or broad-
cast information concerning the balloons from Japan as long 
as they withheld strategic information concerning injuries, 
location of explosions, and frequency of balloon landings. 126 
With the end of the war the radio and press were 
allowed to offer detailed stories about the Japanese balloon-
bombs. Military authoritiGn tried, unsuccessfully, to con-
tinue the newr; blackout on the balloons. 12 'l But they could 
lZ'lK 't 201 
.. oop, EJ2.:._£L__, , p. ·. . , 
126
'"b'd 200 L .. ±.,.; • ' P , • 
127_I.bic!;., pp, zoJ .. ;w4 •. 
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not show that this information was still dangerous. Intelli-
gence information obtained after the war revealed that the 
Japanese .launched approximately ten thousand of these bomb-
laden balloons at a cost of more than ~;1, 000,000. Fewer than 
ten percent of the balloons· launched landed on the United 
States. 128 Byron Price, to his credit, was able to mediate 
the justifiable desires of broadcasters and publishers with 
---- --- -tne-- (--s-oruetinle-fr)-- -jv.stii'iable demands of the- Army~ -
_;I.' he diploma tic:____:£laC'~kout. The code revisions of 
June 15, 191+2, carried a new restriction on the "Premature 
disclosure of diplomatic negotiations or conversations." 129 
~:his single.-sentGn.ce. revision of the codes brought widespread 
and immediate criticism from the press. When these com-
plaints were raised the press code was amended 
". , • only to exchanges relating to the war , 
to apply 
"130 
. . . 
But even with t)1is amendment many felt that censorship of 
diplomatic negotiations could be utilized to cover an almost 
unlimited field. Political censorship was not going to be 
taken lightly by the American press. The Federal Government 
retained sole authority in deciding which diplomatic 
exchanges were "war related." !:i.ew H.e~bli()_ reported that the 
State Department ))ad induced the Office of Censorship to 
--~~""-··------·-~ 
. 
128
rbid. , p. 204; see also Knight, E12. cit. , p. 83. 
Cost supplled-by Byron Price to writer, DeceiiiJier;->20, 1971. 
129.9_9-§.e for Broadc8~~§. ( 6-15--42), p. 6, and Code 
f9r_ Htg __ P1-:_es:2_ (b-15-42), p. b. · 
1 'oO ~ Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
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forbid public discussion of pending diplomatic relations. 131 
Diplomatic negotiations and themovements of the 
President of the United States were necessarily related. 
Roosevelt and many other government officials requested that 
news of their travels be withheld by the press and radio. In 
January of 191<-J President Roosevelt· prepared to travel to 
Casablanca for his now famous meeting with Winston Churchill. 
Many members of the press and radio knew of this impending 
visit but complied with requests from the Office of Censor-
ship that this news be withheld until officially released by 
appropriate authority, 
NewB of t!Je President's domestic travelf.l was also 
blacked out until F.dter they had ocenrred. Not all ed.i tors 
approvt~d of thl.s practice, however. It was an odd si tnation 
for thousands of persons to see the President in their city 
and still deprive the local papers the right to mention it at 
all until they received permission, Even when the press 
cooperated, its representatives became angry when censorship 
regulations denied them the right to print a story in which 
they saw no danger. A situation like that occurred during 
RoomlVel t' s trip to Ca:i.ro in November of' 1943, While the 
President was still hi Cairo, the German radio network 
announced not only that he was there, but also that he would 
soon leave for Iran and a meeting with Stalin, Ame.rican pub-
----------
131 . . . . 
. "Bureaucrat:tc Censorsh:tp," Ne~__ll.E'J?.!:!bl-'~2.· 
October 26, 1942, pp. 531-532. 
1321' . "t 222 
- .,.oop, .S'.P..: __c.2:. . .:. , p. . • 
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lishers immediately requested permission to publish this news 
on November )0, a few hours before the Office of Censorship 
planned to release the information, and a few minutes after 
Germany already had. 1'he Office of Censorship and the White 
House refused to release the information and American pub-
the enemy! 
Election year, 194-4, proved to be particularly diffi-
cult for the Office of Censorship and for the American press. 
The President's po,litical spealdng trips received prior cen-· 
sorship, When DeJaocratic workers in Chicago began distri-
buting tickets to a speech by the Pn,sident in that city, 
local Chicago paJ)Ol~s requested permission to publish what 
everyone knew-- that the President would make a speech in· 
Chieago. ~rhe Office of Censorship grudgingly relented --
partly. The papers were told they could say that it was 
"hoped" the President would speakin Chicago on a particular 
1 JLf day!·- On January 19, 191>5, just one day before Eoosevelt's 
fourth inauguration, the Of'fice of Censorship tightened its 
restriet:i.ons on the publication of news about the Chief 
Executive's future meetings with Allied leaders. Broad-
casters and editors were requested " •• , not to publish or 
91 
broadcast any· information or guesses • • " concerning these 
future meetings. 1J5 
Some members of the American press felt they were 
being scooped by European newspapers. While the loyal 
American press felt compelled to comply with censorship 
requests to suppress news of the President's whereabouts, the 
European press acted under no such restraints. Journalist 
. . . 
---.--wes-tbrooR-Fegie_r_,-a-ngere-dby the restrictions and the Euro-
pean scoops, announced that he would definitely publish 
advance information of the President's next domestic trip, 
", •• in defiance of the censorship which has no legal 
support." 136 Byron Price went immediately to Pegler's 
employer, King Features, and cautioned -- or warned -·· that 
widespn,Hd dC'>flw:,ce of voluntary censorship requests would 
inevitably lead. to compulsory censorship. Pegler failed to 
report on the President's future domestic travels. 137 
1'he State Department, although it denied such al.le-
gations, continued its manipulation of diplomatic news until 
the end of the war. Correspondent's stories dealing with 
diplomatic negotiations or with countries involved in diplo .. 
matic negotiations with the United States were carefully read 
by the State department. One war correspondont complained 
that ". . • despite [Secretary of State HuH's] protestations 
lJ5-·t i d l J.. • 
lJ6J.b' d 
_:. __ !:_._ • p 
1J7J'b' d 
_:,_2;__ 0 • 
pp. 231-2J2. 
p. 2J2. 
that his department imposed no political censorship, it has 
specifically requested the Pentagon people to deliver 
• • • 
up to it any dispatches by returning war correspondents 
which dealt with China • .,1.JS 
On April 5, 1945 Russia demounceO. its non-aggressim1 
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pact. with ,Tapan. Many editors felt the E. us sian action was a 
prelude to a declaration of war on Japan by the Soviet Union. 
-------Many-- be--l-ieved- -this--. --but few could say so 
the Office of Censorship ordered a ban on discussion of the 
subject in the American press. While the European press was 
allowed to export its newspapers ·to the United States with 
editorials speculating on the Russo-Japanese situation, 
American editors \vere prohibited even the right to reprint 
thes~' imported editorials, 'J:herei'ore, if one was to read 
the London J.inic_s: in Wasrdngton he would learn of the diplo-
matic speculation, if he read the Washin_e.:.t.s>!l_Post in London, 
he would not, 'l:he ~shir1._~ton_Post editorialized: 
Well, as we werE! saying, !VIr. l'rice, the 
Far Eastern situatioh is fraught with 
interest and, uh ••. eh • , • pregnant 
with possibilities and, so far as the 
home front is concerned, its the very 
devil of a job to publish a newspaper_ 
in the face o:f censorship inanit:Les,l39 
Byron Price said that speculation by the American press on 
the Russo.-,Japanese situation ". • • could possibly lead to a 
1"8]. . . d 
-' ,;r.l.c Sevarel , 
April 14, 19Li·5, p, Lf16. 
"Censorship in the Saddle," Nation, 
1JO . · 
'Quoted J.n "Well Uh, Mr. Price," .!:!.~~'?!'.~~!· 
16, 1945, pp. 84-85. April 
9} 
Japanese attack on Soviet Russia [and the].sacrifice of 
,140 American lives • • • ~'he Office of Censorship was 
obviously acting under instructions from the State Department. 
Most persons could guess that when Germany was beaten Russia 
would then declare war on Japan. But what many persons did 
L not know was that the United States, Great Britain, and Russia would meet soon in Germany •141 'rhe Office of Censor-
-- -- - - -- - -- - ----
ship banon speculation, at the behest of the Department of 
State, was issued in an effort to protect against premature 
disclosure of this meeting. 
Just before the Allied invasion of Europe the Office 
of Censorship assumed a different position in regards to 
speculation by the press. ~!he rationale in this case was 
that nr3ither the people nor the press knew the exact place or 
time of the invasion, but everyone, including Germany, knew 
an invasion was forthcoming. A ban on invasion speculation 
could have been a dangerous strategy. A virtual blackout of 
speculation might have enabled Germany to more accurately 
predict the invasion date. 142 
So the diplomatic blackout, which included news of 
the President's travels, was, according .to the Office of 
Censorship and the State Department, designed to protect the 
Allied war effort. It also,.if not be desi.gn, then by 
ll.fO Quoted in ib.id, 
141The Potsdam Conference, 
142K . ,_ , 6 oop, ~· c1~., pp. 23 -237· 
circumstance, deprived the American people of important news 
of the Allied war effort, the release of which many editors 
felt would not have hindered that effort. 
On February 1, 1943 the voluntary codes for the press 
and radio were revised and reissued for the second time. 
--------Each of _these new_ codes carried a "Special Note" to editors_ 
and broadcasters which stated: 
You are reminded that whenever anyone 
else, in any part of the country, makes 
a request which appears unreasonable or 
out of harmony with the Code, you are at 
liberty to appeal at once to the Office 
of Censorship. Much confusion would be i~-3 
avoided if such appeals were ;nore frequent. 
'rhis note was apparently included because of the efforts of 
military censors, which often conflicted with policies and 
decisions of the Office of Censon;hj;p. An important addition 
to these codes was directly related to the conflict between 
journalists and military censors. A journalist would, in 
return for permission to tour militarily restricted areas, 
agree, in writing, to submit his material to military censors 
before publication. The codes cautioned that in these cases 
143u. S, Office o:F. Censorship, Code of Wartime Prac-· 
tices for American Broadcasters, Edi ti.on of February!-, 1943 
"["washirigtori~f:-cr::--u-:-s-:-liwei:Y:iment Printing Office, 194J); 
"Special Note" carried on unnumbered page preceding page 1 
(hereafter referred to as Code for Broadcasters (2-1-43); 
see also u o s, Office of censorsh:i:P7-Cod""ii··-·orTtfartime Prac-
tices :for the American Press, Edition-o:(··l:'ebruaryT;·-f92+3 
(WasT1'lngton-~--l5;·c;-:-o~-. Government Printing Office, 1943); 
"Spec.·ial. Hote" on :p. ii (hereafter referred to as Code for 
the PJ.:£5?.§ ( 2--J .. I~J)), -----· 
9.5 
where journalists had made a written agreement with mi;Litary 
authorities, those military authorities retained censorship 
control from which there could be no appeal to the Office of 
0 11<-4 Censorshlp. 
Byron Price, guided by the principles of voluntary 
censorship rather than military desires, adopted a British 
tenet of censorship that said, "What does not concern the war 
- -- ------------ - --- ----- - - - "14 c:· 
does not concern Censorship," :; But military authorities 
acted as though an;y-thing that happened in a country at war 
necessarily concerned the war and was therefore subject to 
military censorship. The Office of Censorship often had to 
compromise its principles in the face of government-supported 
military censorship. At one time tht' Office of Censorship, 
ay,pa!'Emtly acting at the request of military authorities 
working through tl1e administration, required that all stories 
about Alaska destined for publication in the United States 
had to first be cleared by its office. The government 
required prior submission of all news stories from Alaska 
because of Japanese military activity in the Aleutian Islands. 
TimEC took the Office of Censorship and the government to task 
for thiFi blanket censorship, 1'he magazine pointed out that 
the "blue-penciling" of such stories, rather than depriving 
the enemy of information (the Japanese apparently lrnew where 
they were), successfully Jwpt important news out of print in 
. 11+6 the Um.ted States. 
~Phis was not the only time t.he government was charged 
with holding back information on the grounds it would help 
the enemy when in reality it did so to keep information from 
the American public, J·ournalist Arthur Krocl~ was sharply 
critical of military authorities who, with government consent, 
withheld the news that u. s. forces were blockaded on Bataan 
------- ----by ---t-he -~Ja}/anc sc -1-- ---He --said the- J·apanese 
knew of the blockade, but the American people did not, 
1Li·? because the press was not a.llowed to tell them. In a 
similar case Tokyo Radio broadcast that the JapanGse had 
captured four flye_rs from General Doolittle's raiders, but 
the Ur1.ited Statep, GovGrnment waited six months before 
'rhe United States Govern-
rnent • s delay in thi~t instance succeeded only in keeping the 
information from the American people. 
In 19LfJ the U, S. Navy impounded the manuscripts and 
proofs of four new books on the submarine service. The books, 
which had been cleared by the Office of Censorship, were 
designed. to draw men into the short-handed submarine service, 
The Navy· decided the boolr.s contained information important to 
the enemy, even though the JlUblisher pointed out that the 
ll.J-6 
"What Sense Censorship?" ~lJm.<:., <Tune 22, 191+2, 
pp. 58~-60. 
11+'7 Arthur Krock, "Why Our Newspapers Can • t Tell the 
~~ruth," f~ade£!l_fl.i:£est:, November, 191<·2, pp. '75-'?6. 
J.!Hl.,,,,,hat P · ? · 1' 
, n.ce Secrecy." :rJ .. JE~· November 9, 19'-~'2, 
pp. 6t--62. 
same information was carried in national daily newspapers 
without official objection. 149 
Blanket censorship by the government and military 
authorities became increasingly bold in 194J. At the first 
97 
important conference of the United Nations held on American 
soil,l50 soldiers carrying rifles with fixed bayonets barred 
the pret's from the proceedings , 151 
Bernard DeVoto, a frequent administration critic, 
excoriated the governmEmt for withholding and delaying news 
of the war. He charged that ", , . nine months after the 
raid on Tokyo 152 we still have not been told the story. 
Valuable information might be given the enemy if we are 
. ' "'' told'?" .L.)_; 'rhe government fe.l t it would deprive the enemy of 
va1us:blc .informa·-Lion by \vi thhoJ..ding details of tho air raids. 
But there were probably few Japanesco in Tokyo who did not 
149 . . . . "Censorsh~p: S1.lenced Serv1.ce," !.:~,.me, August 2J, 
194-J, pp. 56-5'?. 
l501'he U. N. Conference on Food and Agriculture, held 
at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 to .June J, 19LfJ; see Richard 
B. Morris (ed.), ~-nc;y_<::_lo..eg_Cl,"h'J. ofAl!l_~J:'iCjl,n Hi_~!2.s'L (New York, 
Harper & Row Publlshcrs, 19b.5f, p. Joo. 
l5l"Is Policy of Suppressing the News Ga.ining Top 
Hand in Wa.shington?" J:l_r:_wsweels, February 19, 19~·5, pp. l+O-l.J2, 
l5ZG l D .1" "tl ' f. t . . d ,., k enera. oo .t·c .e s .:u~s a.tr ral on .1.0 .yo was on 
April Hl, 1942. Miscalculations on fuel. conrc:umption pre·-
vented some planes from reaching friendly bases in Ch:lna, 
causing them to land in .Japanese-held territory; see Charles 
Van Doren and others (eds.), Webster's Guide to American 
Hist~E? ( SpdngfieJ.d, Massachuseffs-;- G-~-&·--c::·llfeY::riam Company, 
Pubhshers, 1971), pp. lJ-87-'+88. . 
l5JBernard DeVoto, '"l'elJ. the people the truth," 
!:!§:E"~.5!• April, 1943, pp. 541-54-4·; quotation on p. 5'+J. 
!mow a bout the raids once they began. 'I' he withholding of 
information to avoid aiding the enemy was almost always done 
at the expense of the uninformed public. DeVoto, para-
phrasing the government, said the "American Joe" is told to 
", , , sticlc to his job, pay his taxes, buy bonds, and let 
the government run the war without int<,rference, criticism, 
or even inqui.ry." He fv.rther argued that ". an infor-med 
"154 
_sabotage is secret. The edition of the codes issued 
on February 1, 1943, requested that nothing be said about 
sabotage, Publishers and broadcasters were requested to 
refrain from mentioning any efforts at sabotage by enemy 
agents. Even when reporting accidents, they were advised 
that" .• , no mention of sabotage should be made except on 
• • • appropriate authority "155 'l'his was, according 1 e • t 
to TiEJe magazine, the first time in any United States war 
that salJotage was classified as a military secret. 156 The 
news magazine cogently pointed out that this restriction 
created the erroneous impression that sabotage or saboteurs 
were non--existent in the United States, The criticism was 
timely, for one month later, on August 8, 1942, six young 
Nazl saboteurs Ca]Ytured in the United States were electro-
PP• 543-544. 
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cuted in the nation's capitol. 157 In addition to the rules 
on sabotage these revised codes warned that "The Spread of 
rumors in such a way that they will be accepted as facts will 
1 ~8 
render aid and comfort to the enemy." ~ Some critics 
replied th.at this censorship request was in reality another 
attempt by the government to squelch speculation in the press. 
Hinting that the aim of this restriction was the suppression 
---------of- -fa-ct-s- ra--t-he-r- -t-ha-n- -rumors--J 
remedy for rumors were facts. 159 such criticism must have 
been effective, for in the next edition of the radio and 
press codes (December 1., 1943) the restriction on rumors was 
noticeablJ' absent., 
Were 't,he restrictions on the reporting of sabotage 
justified? For :l long while sabotage was secret. The 
government did not want the public to panic as a result of 
lurid sabotage stories in the domestic press. 160 Nor, as in 
the case of the captured Nazi saboteurs, did the government 
want Germany to know it had captured their agents. 161 In 
l.57Burns, .2E• cit., p. 255. Burns reports that 
President Roosevel i' s -.,.-;- • • only regret about the six who 
died was that they had not been hanged." 
158cc_:9-..£.__f_oz:_jl_!::.Cll':..dC:.!'·sters ( 2-1-J+J), p. 5: see abo 
Co§.e_:for :tdl."'_fress. (2-l-Lij), p. 5. 
l59"Expanding Don'ts," !l:El~· J"uly 6, 19l,c2, p. l<O. 
160rn an effort to avoid potential 1)anic the Justice 
Department, in the F.alJ. of 1942, issued a statement that no 
major acts of sabotage or espionage had been uncovered; see 
I ' . 8 I .1ngeman, _()J2L .• £J. t. , pp, 1 J, 19-l-. 
161s E . 7 G 1 8 ee " sp1onage: enera s vs. Saboteurs," -~~i:F:~• 
July 20, 1942, I'• 15. 
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this respect the censorship restrictions might have been 
justified. However, in light of the extremely small number 
of' saboteurs apprehended in the United States during the war, 
the restrictions were probably unjustified. Research failed 
to turn up more than a dozen actual Axis saboteurs in the 
United States during the entire war. ~~he most celebrated 
case was the apprehension of eight young Nazis who had been 
-.--- -la::n-ae--a----o:rr -t-Ire- -s-hore-s-- -of Long a German 
U-boat in 19Lf2. 162 All of these men were caught quick:ly 
(four of them had barely gotten off the beaches before they 
were apprehended) and six were later executed. 
Before the yoluntary codes for radio and the press 
were rd.ssu~'d, tho Office of Censorship published, on March l, 
1943, a special code that regulated the use of nomnilitary 
1 '~3 
r-adio serv:Lcee. ·"'' In addition to the 925 commercial radio 
stations in thcl United States there were more than ten 
thousand private radio transmitters used by law enforcement, 
civilian defense, harbor, weather, and forestry services, and 
tl . . 1 . d . 1" t. 164 . o 1er munlclpa servlces an facl l ·1es, 'j'he Of:flce of 
Censorship stated that the philosophy of regulating these 
162 See "War of Nerves: !liission from Berlin," 'l'ime, 
July 6, 1942, pp. 13-14. 
1631 ) C' Of'['" n C ~ • ... d f •o t' 
, , .o. · .. : 1ce o:c ,ensors,JJ.p, c:o .e o. Vvar 1me 
I'E"'.<?.!)._::_ps .. .f:.5?.~ .. .J:.i:~nmil~ tarY- rw,_sJ.ig __ _§cn::~j,_ce~T;-lrdl tloii-·of' March 1, 
197.f3 (Washington, D.C.: U.s. Govermnent Printing Office), 
1943; herea.:fter referred to as Code for Nonmilitary Radio ( 3-1-.I.Jj) . -- '"" . --
16LrK oop, 
radio operators 
duration of the 
op. cit, , 
-- "Hams" 
war. 
p. 185. ~.'he activities of amateur 
had been stwpended for the 
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municipal radio services fell somewhere between the compul-
. 165 
sory and voluntary concepts. The restrictions on the 
broadcasting of certain information generally paralleled 
those of the voluntary radio code. However, nonmilitary 
municipal radio services were required to abandon all 
unnecessary use of radio facilities, This special code 
warned that "The unnecessary use of :facilities which dis-
----~----closes _information of value to the enemy is a total loss to 
our war effort," 166 ':Che code for municipal radio services 
was esBentially noncontroversial and it remained in force 
without criticism or modification until May 15, 1945, when it 
was combined in another code. 
On Dec:cmbe:c 1,· 1943, the Office of Censorship reissued 
the code :3 for the press and radio. 167 This third revision of 
the prcess and raclJ.o codes showed little modification in com-
parison with the previous edition, but merely restated the 
pr·ovision:3 of the previous edition, This new edition o:f the 
codes failed to generate significant critical comment. But 
the American press would soon be at war with censorship as a 
result of election year politics, soldiers votes, and 
military censors. 
165c~~~ fol:J!.on_!nilit§:EY __ Ra.?:},.£ (J-1-4-J), p • 1. 
166Ib'd r 
_l __ o' P• 2., 
167u. s. Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime Prac-
tic!:'_? __ for AmeT~C:..<;:.Yl._Jl2::Ya~c~.ster_§, Edi tior!Q·r"Liecember J, f9hJ, 
and Code of Wart1me Practices for the American Press, Edition 
of Decli~iii'ber:1~-;-19lf:TlTiashmgton, D.c.; u. s. G ovemment 
Printing Office), 1943. 
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Soldic"rs • Suffrage, In January of 1944 President 
Roosevelt called upon Congress to pass a Soldier's Vote Bill 
that would provide a single absentee voting .law for eleven 
million servicemen on active duty. 168 The President claimed 
that the vast majority of these soldiers and sailors, unable 
to comply with forty-eight different absentee voting laws in 
as many states, failed to vote in past elections. 
____ The-·f'-resident'-s message ran into stiff opposition in 
Congress. Republicans charged that the }1resident, in an 
election year, was trying to line up soldiers to vote for his 
fourth term. Southern Democrats feared that the proposed law 
would enable Negro soldiers in the South to vote, 169 ~rhe 
bill nevertheles<:< passed Congress and the Soldiers Vote Act 
of l9i+l+ bec>~unc) l3.w. However, an amendment by Republican 
Senato;_' Hobert 'raft to another J.aw1'1° forbid circulation by 
military authorities of any matter containing "political 
argument or political propaganda of any kind designed or 
calculated to affect the result of any election" for federal 
O»·P·i ce 171 
.l .l. -·· .. This law, the result of an", •• Unholy Alliance 
of Hepublieans and reactionary Southern Democrats .• , , .. 172 
168 Burns , .'212!_S} t. , p • 4 JO. 
169Ibid. 
17°The Hatch Act of 19J9. 
171Quoted in Charles G. Bolte, "The War Fronts: 
Solcl:i ers Aren't Supposed to Think," Nation, July 22, 194-4, 
PP• 90-91. ----
1'/2 
-"Dewey and Soldiers Vote," ~......B£)2u£li£, 
2'+, 191J.I+, p. 92. July 
provided military authorities with a censo:r;-ship weapon 
unprecendented in American history. 
lOJ 
ArmJ' officials began barring various publicatlons and 
periodlcals from post exchanges and llbraries on the grounds 
these materlals contained "political propaganda." Army 
authorities justlfied their actions on the basis of the Taft 
amendment, which protected military voters from politlcal 
----- -inf1uence o 
In one case the Army forbid circulation on its bases 
of Charles A, Beard • s book, The Republi_9_, on the grounds it 
was political propaganda. 17J One magazine reported that the 
Army prohibited liberal or pro-New Deal periodicals from 
being sold at pos·~ exchanges, accepting instead only conser-
vat.i V(~ or pro-Eepublican ones, i7Li· Another contemporary 
periocJ.ica.l cont2.:lned three letters from soldiers who charged 
that their superiors forbid the availability of such maga--
zines as Nation, New Republic, Harpers, and Atlantic. 175 One 
----- ------·- --~---
of these soldiers complained that a packet of Nation back 
issues, mailed to him by his mother, was rejected by Army 
officials as "controversial.." Reactionary Army authorities 
were having a field day. The movie "VIi.l.son" was banned from 
post theaters, 8.nd. a biography of Oliver Wendell Holmes from 
July 
1 73"Dangerous Army Censorship," New ReJ! .. 1!J?li9., 
24, 1944, p. 92. 
174-Ib' d 
.!. t 
17,.. 
p. 22). .J"I,etters to the Editors," .tJa"!lon, August 19, 191+4, 
Army library lists because they were consi.dered politically 
propagandistic in content. Army officials, in one sweep, 
ordered 142 American newspapers removed from soldier's 
· clubs·. 176 serv2ce 
Perhaps the most blatant and ridiculous abuse of 
authority by military officials came when an edition of the 
instruction book, the "Official Guide to the Army Air Forces" 
_____ -was- -remo-ved- f:com--1\:rmy library lists be cause .i. t bore a picture 
of President Franklin Roosevelt over the caption "Commander-
In-Chief of the Army and Navy." Other editions of the 
instruction book which did not carry Hoosevel.t's picture were 
retained on the l~brary lists. 17'7 
This was but anothe:c infamoun incident in a long list 
of Army abuses of the power of censorship. 178 Accor·ding to 
Zechariah Chafee, "Military censorship has always tended to 
exceed its bounds and go into political censorship."i79 
Military censorship :in World War II, like the Office of Cen-
sorship, served an important and v.i tal function. 1'hey . both 
kept vital information from reaching the enemy. But, unlike 
the Office of Censorship, military authorities fed greedily 
upon their· censorship powers, They continually tried to 
l'76 .. Idea Blackout," J1e~§X':.~ek, August 21, 194·11., 
pp. lt0-42. 
17711 . 1. ) .l ( e 
178 
· l~ewsweek reported that the Navy had ordered no 
censorsh:ip-OT-riT'c'lrctture or entertainment, ibid. 
l79chafee, op. cit., p. 465. 
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strengthen Rnd expand their influence over.American society. 
Denying soldiers access to political argumentation perverted 
a fundamental.part of the political process. The heart of 
any election contest is debate and disagreement; when 
controversy is censored and eliminated elections become 
meaningless and needless. Even with the cessation of 
official government censorship at the end of the war, 
mi-1-ttary- au-t:ho:t'ities -continued to impose their own brand of' 
censorship on the American press. A reporter and a photog-
rapher were detained by military police and part of their 
equipment confiscated when, more than a week after the war 
was over, they tried to collect interviews and pictures 
a·board a troop train. l.SO Capricious censorship by m.ili tary 
authorities was e. burden on the Office of Censorship, and on 
the country, during World War II. 
the security of the atomic bomb project was It" • the 
censors' most exciting assignment .•• ,.181 From the 
spring of 194-J, when the atomic bomb project began, until 
Presideni; Truman's announcement on August 6, 191•5, that the 
bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, hardly a day went by that 
the O:ffice of Censorship did not have to issue a confidential 
warning concerning accidental allusion to the secret project. 
Thousands of persons in the United States knew of the c;ecre-c 
HlOKoop, .2:f!..!..._£~_!, , p, 2'?0, 
181J.£:i,s!·. p. 272. 
= 
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atomic experiments. Thousands more could J:tave made accurate 
guesses about the importance of the project simply by 
referring to Censorship's admonitions. The Office of Censor-
shj.p warned against broadcasting or publishing any infor-
mation at all concerning atom smashing, atomic energy, atomic 
fission, atom splitting, radium, nidioacti.ve materials, heavy 
water, hi.{:!;h voltage discharge equipmcmt, cyclotrons, polonium, 
-ur-.:'3..-n-i-um-,---yt-t-erbium~ hafnium, protactinium, thenium, thoritun~ 
I· • 182 or deu· .. erJ.um. The list seemed endless. 
Add to this the fact that the atomic bomb project 
(!mown under the code name "Manhattan Project") required the 
use of over one-half million acres of land and the virtual 
:i.solation of nearly one hundred thousand work0rs18J and their 
families, and tlw extent of Censorship • s job can begin to be 
x·eaJ.ized. Heference to atomic power or its long list of 
related subjects had to be deleted from all types of publica-
tions -·· even comic books, One SUJ2~..,?..2} issue showed that 
comic strip hero withstanding a bombardment of electrons from 
a cyclotron. At the request of the Office of Censorship the 
story was real'ranged and future issues of ~man avoided 
mentioning anything related to atomic power, 181+ Fictional 
accounts of the use of atomic power had to be modified or 
deleted when they came too close to the truth. 
p. 273. 
181j'Ib' d ~OJ p. 2'?7 •. 
10? 
After the bomb had been dropped on Japan, editors and 
broadcasters were released from their. promise to omit dis-
cussion of the weapon, much to the dismay of military 
authorities. Of the secrecy surrounding the Manhattan 
Project, Byron Price said: 
Been a newspaperman all my life and 
the only thing I could do about the 
greatest story of the age, or any l85 age, was pray nobody would p:r.int it. 
When ~tr!e- aton1Tc- r)omh vias dropped on Japan,- one of the biggest 
-- and last jobs of the Office of Censorship was finished. 
The success of the atomic bomb project was due, in a very 
large part, to the efforts of the Office of Censorship and 
the American press and radio. 
Voluntary censorship provided a second line of 
defense in the wa~· on words, 9".'he rapport and cooperation 
that existed between the Office of Censorship and the 
American Press and radio was a significant contribution to 
the Allied victory in world War II. 1'hat victory not only 
secured the rit:;ht of freedom for millions of people 
throughout the world, it also helped secure the right of a 
free pres:3 to exist in the United States during a very 
difficult time of war. 
p • 22 e 
18 5Q.uoted in "Intercepts," N~U2.~'ker, May 11, 1946, 
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VICTORY, DEA'rH, AND FREEDOM 
Relaxed Vigilance: The Final Edition of the Codes 
~ -- • • •«W __ _ 
On May 15, 19~·5, the Office of Censorship issued the 
_ ---- --Tinarectl tion -of th-e voluntary censorship codes, 1 Although 
four separate media are included -- the press, domestic and 
nonmilitary radio, and, for the first time, television ---
this combined code covers less than three printed pages. 
Many previous restrictions were absent from this new edition, 
most notably tho2e that dealt wi tll v;eather and sabotage. The 
remaining requests were greatly condensed. Tllis w2.s the last 
voluntal'Y censorship code issued by the Office of Censorship; 
it remained in effect until the end.of the war. 
"The first and last principle to be remembered • • • 
is that censorship should come into being solely as an instru-
ment of war." 2· 1'hus Byron Price, in his final report as 
------~--------
1 . U. s. Offlce of' Censorship, Code of' Wartime 
Praetices for the American Press ancl""J\2:cB:o~-EdTilon of 
i\irny rs-.-'T945\WElShington';"iT.c .7u--:-s-:-Govermnent Printing 
Off.i.ee) , 191+5, 
211yron Price, quoted in Historical Reports on W,,_r 
~dminiGtr-c::tion, :L__ReE_Sr~_£J:!__!he_ Of;f:i_c:_<?__£f C-~-l2:~SJ_r.'Shi,p (Wash-
lngton, D.C.: U.s. Government Printing ofl':;_ce, 191->5), p. l. 
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Director of the Office of Censorship, limited the use of cen-
sorship in a free society. On August 15, 1945, just one day 
after the victory over Japan, President Truman signed the 
following order to the Director of the Office of Censorship: 
In accordance with the recommendation 
submitted by him on June 27, 1945, the 
Director of Censorship shall on 
August 15, 1945: 
l, Declare .. voluntary censorship of 
- - -- - -th-e .l:fre_s_s- and radio at an end. 
2. Direct that the Office of Censor-
ship cease at once the censorsh.ip 
of all in·ternational communications. 
J, Give JO days notice to all employees 
of the Office of Censorship, except 
for a small group needed for 
liquidation of the Agency.J 
'J:he o':ffice of Censorship was out of business. It had 
operated for .forty-four months. Employing, at the peak of' 
. h . 
.its opel.'ations, :LI.i-,1}62 persom>,.., the Office of Censorship 
spent approximately $90,000,000,5 According to Byron Pr.ice, 
if resu1 ts could be measured. in dollars and cents, the funds 
provided for voluntary censorship would represent the best 
investment in security ever made by the United States. 6 
On the same day that President 'J:ruman ordered the 
demobilization of the Office of Censorship, Byron Price 
notified the nation's editors ancl broadcasters that official 
The peak was in February of l9l•J. 
5lJJi_£. ' p. J. 0. 
. ~~:heodore_Koop, Yi?-~E~- .. -~(Silenc_~. (Chicago: 
Un~ versrty of Gh~cago Pross, 19461. · p, 2Lf6, 
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censorship had ceased, and that the Code of Wartime Practices 
for the American Press and Radio was cancelled.? 
The American press and radio were an "army behind the 
. 8 
army" that achieved victory over the enemies o:f freedom in 
the war on words, 1'hat victory was a welcome death bell that 
tolled the end of the Office of Censorship. ~~hat victory was 
also a freedom bell that rang in the restoration of a free 
?Director of tbe Office of Censorship, PR-65, 
[Press Release No. 65] (WashiDgton, D.C.: U. S~ Office of 
Censorship), [August 15, 1945]. 
8
u. S. Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime 
Practices for American Broadcasters,-rKdi'ri'on-oJ: January 15, 
19 2 \'iia.i3Eii1gfon-; n.c-.:~u.-·s-:-Governrnent [Printing Office, 
19'1·2 ) ' p. '1. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
The Office of _Censorship: A J;aclc of Attention 
The Office of Censorship has recej_ved an undeserved 
l ____ . __ l§.c:_k_p_;L_at~tcm:t:ion- .f-rom- historians involved in scholarly 
research of World War II. The introductory chapter of·this 
paper gives two main reasons for that lack of attention: 
historians interested in the war years of 19Lf2--19~'5 have 
tended to concentrate on the war itself, leaving the domestic 
picture largely unde\reloped; 1 and the inaccessibility o:f 
governme.JYC docur,;,o,nts directly rel::rt<·d to the Office of' Censor .. 
ship hinders a full or even adequatl' analysis of that office. 
Becaucc the Federal Goven11nent still refuses, at this 
:Late da:tE• ,. to release pertinent documentary evidence on the 
Of.f.ice of Censorship, the historian is forced to rely- upon 
secondnr;y· sout'ces. The number of secondary- sources dealing 
wit);. the Off:i.ee o.f Censorship is quite small.. I<'ortmmtely-, a 
nvmber of people who wer-e directly involved with Censorship 
activ.:i tJ.Es during World War II, incJ.uding the Director of the 
Offi e•:~ o:f:' Cen.sor-ship, Byron Price, are still 1iving. Some of 
1 
"Jhn F. Heath,, "Dotn\:fltie America during World War II: 
RE•search Gppcr·tcm:i.ti.c>; for Historians," The Journa.J. ·of 
Ame·:c.l,c,ln Hist . ._•rJ, LVIII (~;eptember, 1971T;--:.Jotr;-·----
........ ,.,-... ,...~----·-.... -~. ·-·· --~ -·-······ ··~---· 
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these persons have willingly and eagerly o.ffered their 
assistance, through correspondence and personal interviews, 
in thls research project. 
Compulsory ~-l8orshlp: Planned Success 
Compulsory censorship was a·planned success. It had 
to work, for there were no alternatives. Submission to com-
pulsory- :r.;eguJ.affons was mandatory, with stl:Lf penalties 
noncompliance or disobedience. Compulsory censorship was 
often ruthletc>s and almost always arbl trary. 2 The ul timat8 
objective of compulsory censorship, or, for ths.t matter, all 
censorship, wa.s t'? deprive the enemy of aid and comfort and 
. . . A . 3 J.nformation thctt would help him klll mer1cans. It was 
necessar;{ to i:eq1 a watch on the borders of the United States 
to see that valuable information was not allowed to escape 
and fall into the hands of the enemy. For example, a clerk 
who, unwittingly or intentionally, included shipping dates 
and routes in his cables could easily assist a submarine 
commander in aiming his torpedos, 
Compulsory censorship also had to protect valuable 
conuriodit.ies: essential to the A:Llied prosecution of the war. 
There were within the United States dur:i.ng the war a small 
,, 
"'Director of the Office of Censorship, PR-29, [Press 
Release No. 29_] (WaHhhigton, D.C.: U.S. O{fice"o'f'-Cerisor-ship, 
August lJ, l.9lf2.), p. 1. These Censorship press releases. here--
af'ter reJ'rnTc'd to as Censor[lhip Press Release No. , (date). 
--. --·-~~---------·------.. ·~---· 
p. l.. 
llJ 
number of Axis spies and trained agents. An important part 
of the job of compulsory censorship dealt with putting these 
spiEHl and agents out of business. One former Censorship 
employee has claimed that 189 spies were caught and convicted 
4 in the United States during the war. This paper retells two 
of those spy stories. 
But compulsory censorship was not always used for its 
intended purpose. There were persons in the Federal Govern-
ment who were willing to use censorship regulations to.stifle 
criticism of the government, 'l'he Kellems story was the most 
infamous of these cases. Byron Price was probably innocent 
of any malfeasance. in the Kellems incident, but there is no 
substantial evid<"·nce currently available to allow an adequate 
assessment of th~' guilt or .innocence of any one pGrson in 
this ease. However, based on the evidence that is available, 
inve.stigation of the Kellems case should begin near the top 
of' goveJ:nmt:mt echelons rather than the bottom. 
Compulsory censorship was used well and abused badly, 
Its use provided for a planned success in the war on wordst 
its abuse remains a warning sign to those who must direct, o:r. 
be directed by, :future censorship programs. 
G(mr>orship was the main weapon used in the war on 
words, and that weapon ·had to be aimed where the words were. 
1
+Mary Kn:Lght, "'l'he Secret War of Censors vs. Spies," 
R>::s,td~E.§..J21£.j.£§.!, !Vlar'ch, 191+6, p, '?9. 
j__ 
It had to be aimed at those who held dear the free and 
unlimited use of words -·- the American press and radio •. 
'rhe Director of the Office of Censorship was under 
instructions from the President to". • coordinate the 
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voluntary effort of press and radio to withhold from circu-
lation information which would aid the enemy in his prose--
cution of the war.".5 The Office of Censorship, under the 
-
able leadership of Byron Price, constructed and issued the 
voluntary censorship codes that were used to regulate the use 
of free speech by the press and radio. Any regulation of 
free speech produces an immediate reaction in a society that 
reveres and deifiEls that freedom. The regulation and 
restrict1on o:r free speech was based. on a quasi-military 
strategy, '01ben planning a battle ctrategists must assess 
the necessary sacrifices tha.t will enable the army to w:Ln 
the battle. In the war on words the limits of free speech 
had to be narrowed. The soldiers themselves -- broadcasters 
and editors -- had to accept this meaGured sacrificr.'! if the 
war was to be won. Newspapers and radio had to limit their 
'traditional tendencies to speculate, advise, and criticize. 
Failure to do this, in some cases, might have aided t!Je enemy. 
The American press and radio were sometimes recalci triJ.nt ~ but 
most often cooperative. 1'hey realized that refusal to 
cooperate under a system of voluntary censorship, regar(l.loss 
of how Etringent the regulations sometimes were, could h8.Vt~ 
.5Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971. 
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resulted in reversion to a system of complete compulsion. 
And the country was not lacking for proponents of 
complete compulsion. They existed in the highest government 
offices and in the nation's newsrooms. The efforts of the 
Roosevelt administration to make the "Official Secrets Bill" 
the law of the land provides support for this statement. 
J<'ortunately for the country the Office of Censorship was 
headed by a man who believed that the war on words could be 
won without complete abrogation of freedom of speech. To 
achievce this the voluntary censorship codes were reviewed 
every six months and modified and reissued whenever the need 
wo.s indicated, Not all material considered for publication 
was submitted to the Office of Censorship for clearance, 
Editol~e: and broacJ;;e.sters submitted only those items that were 
doubtful in 11ature. Daily newspapers also received frequent 
directives from the Office of Censorship automatically, ·tJnw 
further eliminating the need to submit much material. By 
referring to i;he voluntary codes many decisions could be made 
within the editorial offices of a newspaper. 
'l'be item that provided the most difficulty was the 
publication of' unit identifications and ship names and 
addresses for soldiers and sailors. A notice in a home town 
paper that Joe Doal~:s was stationed in England with the First 
Armored Division could. easily a_ssist the enemy in assessing 
Allied troop strength. This problem was most frequent with 
the small weel~:lies, church bt!lletins, and home tovm news 
coluxms that merely wanted their readers to have some news of 
their friends and neighbors. To combat this problem the 
Office of Censorship offered the best advice it could: 
If you know what ship a sailor is 
on, or what company or regiment a 
soldier is with overseag, then you 
know a military secret. 
This warning was usually effective. 
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Most of the personnel of the Office of Censorship 
tried to do the ber;t job they could. But mistakes were made 
··- and expected. Sometimes these mistakes resulted from a 
momentary lack of foresight,· and other timer; they were the 
direct result of government interference. Byron Price stated 
that the Office of Censorship " .• , was almost completely 
free of instructions or interference under two Presidents."? 
But tho frr:>E•clom of speech was not. always free from inter-
fercnce by govex·mnent of:ficiah' -·· including Presidents. The 
case of _§ocial~tice_ -- the organ for Father Charles 
Coughl:i.n, the ''radio priest" -- provides an example of this 
kind of interference. The Office of Censorship could also 
bring down its ovm brand of wrath upon a newspaper that 
failed to comply with Censorship requests. 'l'he Molotov visit 
and the 1:'h.~l.ade1El.!~flpi}y Nev;s. story was a case in point, 
A large part of Censorship • s job wo-,s protecting 
military secrets. Vital information about ships, planes, and 
troops had to be withheld. Plans for the invasion of Europe 
. ~'rheodore. Koop, .Y~~ap_on of Sil.~nct:, ( Chic:ago: 
Um.ve1:·sJ.ty of ChJ.cago Press, 194b), p. 238 •. 
'?Byron Price to writer, November 8, 1971.. 
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had to be protected from premature disclosure. Weapons 
development and related experiments were known by many 
editors and broadcasters, but they wi ti1held publication of 
this information .. Byron Price felt the atomic bomb project 
was the best kept secret of the war. 8 This secret became 
"the censors' most exciting assignment."9 
"For the most part, the program of voluntary compli-
____ -------------------------- . .. . . 1 ('I 
ance was a complete success ... ~- But; according to Byron 
Price, ", , , if the experiment of voluntary compliance had 
failed, advocates of compulsion were ready to take the field 
without a moments delay," 11 'l'he threat of compulsion pro-
vided the impetus for compliance with the voluntary codes, 
making voluntary censorship .. • . 
glove~;; :1. 2 
• an iron fist in a velvet 
'£he progn:;_m of voluntary cem;orship of tb.e American 
press and radio was a strategic success -- in spite of the 
Army. That the program was a success is proved by the :fact 
that the proponents of compulsory censorship failed to gain 
the upper hand. And they tried, And they had support. 'I'hey 
had the statistical support of a frightening majority of the 
B"Out of Office: Gone, the Blue Pencil," Newsweek, 
August 27, 1945, pp. 78-79. 
9Koop, 5~E.!_ _ _9it., p. 272. 
10J-olm Fetzer to writer, November 18, 19'(1. 
11g_£ni§~rship...; . .P~.r;s Rc l2_f?:.S..£_.No. 6_f.l., August 30, 194 5. 
12sh~;rman J-I. Dryer, Hadio In Wartime (New York: 
Greenberg, Publisher, Inc, , ·-T91i2-)~p;---27-,.-
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Americs.n people. One study made during the first week of the 
war revealed that eighty-five percent of the American people 
approved of governmental delay in providing news of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. Only one person in ten felt censor-
ship was too strict, twenty percent felt it was too lax, and, 
throughout the war, two-thirds of the people felt they were 
13 being told a.s much as the government could tell them. 
Sta t.?s came out second- best, Thousands of American sailors 
suffered violent deaths at the hands of a momentarily 
superior Japanese navy. The United states Government pleaded 
that such gra:phic .war news would adversely affect public 
morale, ~mel nw.ch of this news wcu; delayed or withheld. But 
a survey X;(~:Ld by the Offic:e of War Information in 19/j-J 
revealed that a plu:r.ali ty of tlJ.e Americt:tn pe.ople .approved of 
printing news stories and pictures "showing how American 
Solclier"' ff · ·' d · "14 - .... _ are su ·er1ng anu yu1g. 
These were the forces with which Byron Price had to 
wrestle in the war on words-- theproponents of compulsion 
and an apathetic populace with a latent appetite for gore! 
!Vli.li tary censorship threatened freedom of speech more 
than any other form of censorship uBed in the war on words. 
(New Y 
1
3Dar;ie
1
otl Ka:z ,
1 
.'?_t~ a=-.~· o f_ll9l::t_~9p1:1J-1~~~~-ED~1~J'.[O)i@J];,<md~ orlu ho , HJ.ne '!art and Wu1ston, 19 ;;·l· 1 , p. •13. 
1
'+rtid. 
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Military censorship was ubiquitous; it permeated the entire 
range of the compulsory.and voluntary censorship programs. 
Army offidalr; tested their cenr;oring strength not only in 
the realm of free.speech; but also in the realm of free 
thought. Overzealous and reactionary Army officials, inter-
preting law to satisfy their own whims, tried to regulate the 
pJ~inted material read by American servicemen. When President 
R-60£1eve~JX a11oweo:--the Soldiers Vote BHl to become law, l5 he 
gave his military opponents a censorship weapon they never 
dreamed they would get. Thir; law, with its related amendment, 
allovmd .Army officialr; to clas8ify anything they did not like 
boolw, movies, n<;;wspapers, even a picture of the President 
of trw United st,~;tcs -- as political propaganda o 
'I'he ef:f:'orts of military myrm:i dons threatened the 
Bllccer::s of' voluntary censorship and argues strongly in favor 
of civilian control of future censorship programs, 
Byron PriCE! watJ fifty yea.rs old when President Roose--
velt asked him to r;ecome the Director of tlw Of'f':i.ee of Censor-
ship, Half' of his life had been Bpent as a n<~vmpapcrman and 
freedom of the press was a ma;jor part of hiB life o He would 
15Roosevelt wss disappointed with the bill in :i:ts 
final form, ec:pecially when it was accomp:cmied with tbe :raft 
amendment to the Hatch Act of 19J9, which prohibited tho 
trancmir;s:i.on of political propaganda to servicemen on active 
duty, ~'he President allowed the bill to become law without 
his Eignature; Bee ,James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt, 'l'hco 
SoldifH· of Fn~edom (New York: Harcourt Bl"nce-Jc;:i/ari.'o·v·J.·c.h,-Ii1c-; .. ;-T970T;-·:p-;·-z.f3 1 . 
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no more unquestioningly surrender that freedom than he would 
his life, for to surrender one would be tantamount to 
surrendering both. But Price believed " there was • • • 
no'thing automatic about the establishment of. free speech in 
the United States ,16 Price disliked censorship; it • • • 
wa$ almost automatic for any conscientious newspaperman to 
find censorship distasteful. The opposing concepts of 
job of administering one and preserving the other is placed 
in the hands of the same man. It was necer;sar;,r for' Price to 
convince his professional associates of the need to balance 
censorship and free speech, and to persuade them that 
voluntary cen:::o1·ship ·during wartime could work to preserve 
the :freed''""' of speech and thE: pres2, Most of these persons 
"'1 •,. . l'l't J? were move" .:q l"rJ .. ce. • s pernuas:J.Ve an J. ·y. · Even as he 
persuaded broadcasters and editors to cooperate with the 
requests of voluntary censorship, Price reminded them ·that 
his remarks were made " , • in justification of' censorship, 
not in praise of it," 18 It would be redundant to state here 
·the ways in which Price was able to balance the needs of war~ 
time censorsllip against the preservation of free speech. It 
p. 2. 
P• ?. 
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is enough to say he did it -- the feat speaks for itself. 
During the war many persons criticized the Office of 
Censorship, Byron Price, the government, and the military 
excursion into censorship. After the war many persons 
continued to criticize the government and military censorship, 
but most had nothing but praise for Byron Price. Journalist 
Arthur Krock, in a scathing attack on censorship, was still 
abre-1;0 saYtlifit -tne Uf'fice of Censorship was " .•• ably and 
intelligently administered."l9 Professor Zechariah Chafee of 
the University of Chicago also praised Price's skill in 
' . . t . t f 1 t h. 20 aumJ.nJ.s er~ng -he program o vo un ·ar·y censors J.p. 
The voluntary censorship program was not perfect; it 
could have been better. And it could have been worse. A 
very delicate balance was maintained. between the rights of a 
free preBro and tlle necessities of wartime censorship. That 
delicate balance depended upon the ability of Censorship 
officials to recognize the value of free speech and the 
limits of censorship. Byron Price recognized those values 
and those limits. His singular ability enabled him to 
successfully administer the program of voluntary censorship. 
Voluntary censorship had been tried before and it had failed. 
Byron Price, and the members of the American press and radio, 
proved that such a program could. work. 
1.9 Arthur Krock in "Public Opinion Quarterly," Spring, 
191>2, .PP. 21+--26, reprinted in Robert E. Summers ( comp,), 
Wartime Censorship of Press and Hadio (New Yor·k: H. W. Wilson 
t;o!i'lpimy, "'T9l:f:;n--;-p: 22)-. --··---------
20Chafee, 2~ci~. 
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Perhaps this paper's appraisal of the Director of the 
Office of Censorship is best summarized by quoting the man 
himself: 
You •ve got to be unspeakably profane 
on the subject of censorship or 
you've no right to be a censor at 
all • , • . I had that right,21 
Byron Price had had a full career in journalism 
behind him when he came to the Office of Censorship. When 
President Roosevelt summoned him to be Director of Censor.-
ship, Price was serving as Executive News Editor of the 
Associated Press, the foremost position in that organiz.ation. 
In 1944 Price was a,warded a special Pulitzer citation for 
the creation and administration of the volunta.ry censor-
ship code:.~. 22 While the Office of Censorship was being 
demobilized. in 1945, President Truman asked Price to go to 
Germany as his personal representative to mak:e a study of' 
tht" relations between the American occupation forces and. the 
German people, 23 In 1946 President 1'ruman awarded Price the 
Medal for Merit in recognition of his able administration of 
the Office of Censon>hip and for his unique skill at 
organizing "the American press and radio within the sys·t.cm of 
voluntary censorship. In 191~,8 he was made an honorary Knight 
May 
21BKron Price, quoted in "Intercepts," .N..!'l.YJ_,X.9rk~r, 
11' 19 f6 t p. 22. 
22~].!_()_:_!;1 Wll<? _ _in_~me_ric~?:, XXIV ( 191+6), p. 1906. 
2'' 
..>Historical Reports on War Administration, A l1eJ.lort 
on the Offiee of Censorship (Washington, D.C.: u, s·:-·c"ovei'n-
iiient._i5i7frrfrriii···(Tf1'Tc(i7._I9If:Sf, p. 18; hereaftc,r re:Cen"ed to as 
11e.;eort _9!!._!he _,9!fice of C<,:}2.@.£rsh?:l!_. 
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Commander of the British l~mpire by George VI of England. 24 
From 1947 to 1954 Byron Price served as an Assistant 
Secretary-General of the United Nations and was responsible 
for directing the construction of the buildings that house 
that organization today. 25 In 1951i. Price retired to his 
home in Chestertown, Maryland, where he lives today. 
The War on Words: Rems.ining QmJstions 
------ ---------------=·=~~=----.-~---------~~-~. ·--·---
This paper has probably raised more questions than it 
has answered. Who leaked the Kellems correspondence to Drew 
Pearson and John Coffee? Was the State Department the 
source? Was someone acting on instructlons from President 
Roosevelt aB Vi.v5.en Ke.llems charged'? These correspondence 
"Intercepts" are lodged in the National Archives and cannot 
be opened except on order of the President of the United 
26 States. Did the Roosevelt Administration attempt to sub-
vert its pul)lic position on voluntary censorship by bac:ldng 
the r;o .. called "Official Secrets Bill?" What influenc:e did 
the Army exert in support of this bill for complete and 
compulsory censorship? The activities of Army officials in 
thwarting or impeding the circulation of liberal or pro-"Ne\•1 
Deal publications certainly indicates their approval of com-
24}'1J}2":"s Who j,n_ftm£_JZiC"<!; 1 XXVI, 0950) 1 PP• 2215-·2216. 
25Based on personal interview with Norman Carlson, 
January 11, 1972; sec also "V/her"l Are They Now?" Newsweek, October 2, 1961, p. 14·. . "" _______ _ 
··l(., 
'
0 ! t tl O"f' " C h' 18 _;~:E.?.E.. ___ 5~IL ... "J~ .... _I _2:__'?e OI ensors J.J?., p, , 
plete and compulsory censorBhip. Many persons were convicted 
of evading censorship regulations, and they often received 
harsh punishment. Were these convictions always justified, 
or were the Federal courts sympathetic to J·ustice Department 
prosecutions? That civil liberties for select minorities 
were abandoned by the government during the war is, for many, 
a foregone conclusion. But what about Velvalee Dickinson's 
case prejudiced because of her social relationships with 
persons of ,Japanese ancestry? Similar incidents of such 
racial jingoism were not unknov·m in the United States during 
Worlcl War II. 
Cenr-wrship restrictions on radio programming were 
stringeJYt; and w3ually strictly enfoi·ced. Had.io transmirssi.ons 
were instantaneous, An';/ radio mescage, whether intended for 
domestic listeners or, as the government feared, for enemy 
agents, could be easily monitored by enemy naval craft close 
by the shores of the United States. But because the radio 
waves were so well-monitored by the Federal C o1mnunica tions 
Commission, no such enemy transmissions wel'e actually docu-
mented during the entire war. Indeed, one researcher has 
determined that there was but a single attempt at a radio 
transmission from a station in the United States to Nazi 
Germany. 'J'hat radio transmi. tter was Joca.ted in the German 
Embassy i.n Vl<tshington and it was immediately silenced, 27 
There is one remaining question that must be con-
sidered here. Does the United States Government maintain 
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viable contingency plans for official censorship in the event 
of a future world war? According to Norman Carlson, former 
Chief Postal Censor, there remained after the war a censor·· 
ship "shadow organization".that included a. "Director-
designate," Byron Price, after his retirement from the 
---
------------United Nation-s i.i1I9 )1-f; became a consultant to -the government 
on censorship plmming. In effect, he was the Director-
designate, At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 
Price was again asked, this time by President Kennedy, to 
assume the respon~ibility of directing a censorship program 
in tho ev<mt of vmr. 
Following the Cuban missile crisis Price requested 
his reJ.erme as Director-designate for censorship planning. 
He was then past seventy years of age; a new generation had 
succeeded to the news desks of the country· and Price felt he 
no longer had the necessary contacts in Washington and else-
where that would allow him to function effectivel;>r as the 
Director of future censorship programs. President Johnson 
eventually granted Price's req_uest, choosing as his replace-
ment Theodore Koop, who had been the Assistant Director of 
the Office of Censorship during V/orld War n. 28 Koop was in 
turn released from this position by President Nixon. 
28 r f t. f t. . . 
. . n: orma .1..on on u ure censorshJ.p plann1.ng based on 
personal intervicnv with Norman Carlson, ;ranua.ry 1.1, 1972, 
and Byron Price to writer, F'ebruary 25, 19?2, 
'fhe position of Director-designate was abolished on 
December i5, 1970. Censorship planning is now handled by 
the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the old title 
"Office of Censorship" has been replaced with that of 
"Wartime Information Security Program," 29 Future wartime 
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censorship problems are being considered even now. Sophis-
ticated communications systems spawned by the world-wi.de 
te-chnological revolu'tlon are constantly being analy?.ed in 
relation to the goverrunent' s ability to censor them. Tele·· 
vision, communications satellites, interplanetary communi-
cations, even the possibility of transmitting messages by a 
laser beam that cannot be interrupted or broken, are just a 
few of the ))J:·ob:Lems be:i.ng worlwd on today by the Office of 
In an 2-ddx·ess befor-e the Georgia Press Institute in 
191+4, Byron Price listed the principles he felt should be 
adhered to in the event censorship should again become 
necessary.JO These pr:i.nciples generally paralleled the 
provisions of' the voluntary censorship codes used in World 
War II. Each of these principles could also be interpreted 
as individual indictments of either military or governmental 
sup11ression of free speech, Price, as did many others, 
recognized the potenth\1 danger of governmental suppress:i.on 
29Eugene J, Quindlen, Assistant Direetor for Govern-
ment Preparedness, to writer, March 15, 1972, 
JO Censorshin Press Release No. 54, Februarv 19, 194~-' p. If:-·---·-=---- . " 
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of opinion and criticism. The reactionary, rhetoric of 
Social Justice was easily discernable, butwould gover-nment 
suppression of a newspaper, even if it was of the same ilk 
as _!?ocial Justice, be as easily accomplished and condoned 
today as it was in 1942? Probably not, The recent attempt 
of the Federal Government to impose prior restraint on those 
papers that published the so.:.called "Pentagon Papers" stands 
as proof that the government prefers some type of censorship. · 
Price's principles take into account the efforts of the Army 
to impose repressive censorship during World War II. There 
is evidence today that the Army continues to use it'S own 
brand of censorship. 'rheir efforts to cover up the "!Vly Lai 
!Vlassacre" and similar incidents, suggests that official 
cerwox-ship is in fact a reality. 
In the event of a future global war, the conflict 
will be of such immense proportions that military superi-
ority will undoubtedly assume primary importance. In the 
military mind this will inclu:i e, if we are to recognize the 
lessons of' history, the complete submission of a free press, 
and with it free speech, to the dictates of military rule. 
The American press, and the people, ·should prepare for that 
possibility, and ])rotect themselves against it, For in that 
event, censorship will surely come. Even while reviewing 
the past from the advantageous perspective of the present 
one mu:.o;t admit that the withholding of some strategic infor-
mation f'rom public knowledge was necessary during World War 
II, and will be necessary in World War III. 
During World war II Byron Price sought to expose 
unfounded rumors in order to prevent public panic, But 
rumors must be fought with facts, and all possible factual 
information must be made available to the people. The 
majority of the requests in the voluntary censorship codes 
during World War II were valid and justified. There were 
128 
some mistakes, rrhe seriousness of those mista.kes is easily 
exaggerated, but -thei should not be unduly dismissed. An 
analysis of the conduct of federal and military officials in 
regards to censorship during the war demands that one con-
demn utilization of the "necessities of war" to silence 
valid criticism of, a politically conscious administration. 
The realith:r; o:f the period require that one recognize that 
th('' pubJic p;:·ol>abJ.y supported the suppression of pro-fascist 
nowrc>J>apors lilr.e Social JustiN,, But in the event of a 
future conflict we must insure that a journalist or news-" 
paper has clearly and undeniably, in public trial, violated 
the Espionage Act before that newspaper or journalist is 
suppressed and f>ilenced. 
From 191+2 to 1945 news of the war was often delayed 
and misrepresented, sometimes at the request of Army author-
ities, sometimes at the request of administration officials. 
Tho voluntax'Y censorship system administered by Byron Price 
was undoubtedly better than the alternatives available in 
the war on words. No censorship at all in tiu1e of war is 
clearly unrealistic. But compulsory censorship of the :free 
press and. radio would have only served to provide the United 
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States with enemies in its own camp. 
Censorship in wartime has been an historical reality. 
Voluntary systems were tried during the American Civil War 
and World War I. Both of these voluntary systems collapsed 
and were replaced by a form of compulsory censorship. Censor-
ship of a free press and radio will be a reality in the next 
global conflict. That censorship system must be voluntary 
- - ---
and under civilian control if a free press ·-- and free 
speech -- are to endure. 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I have relied heavily on documents from the u. S. 
Office of Censorship. b:_ Rep or~. on the Office of CeJ:l~§_l}J:...P.. 
was prepared in 19LJ·5 by Byron Priee and his staff as part of 
1 the Historieal Reports on War Administration. A disappoint-
J~-·-------i:rrg-ly---s-1-roj:t-rep-ort--,-i-t-- does- contain valll.8.ble_ inf_orma.tion on_ 
the organizational period of the Office of Censorship. 
A collection of the wartime censorship codes is 
available at the library of the University of California at 
Berkeley. 1'his collection includes the Code of Wartime Prac-
. ~.~.--·---~---~---
Postal Censorshi£_,Begulations. . Study of these codes was 
indispensable to the research. 
Also in the University of California library is a 
small collection of press releases issued by the Director of 
the Office of Censorship from January, 1942, through August, 
191+5. Very incomplete (there are only fifty .. eight press 
releases in this library-bound volume), these press releases 
supplem.ent thEJ various edi ticins of the censorship codes; 
they also contain textual copies of addresses by Byron Price, 
'l'he:co has been only one boolc published on the Office 
of Cem.;orship and it was used extensively in the writing of 
lJO 
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this paper. Wea;pon of Silence, by ~~he odor~ Koop, documents 
a wide range of Censorship activities. Koop was the 
Assistant Director of the Office. of Censorship, and while he 
was justifiably critical of military censorship, he did not 
always revj.ew government censorship with the same critical 
judiciousness. 
Wartime C~~g_rsh:iJ2.. of Press and l:~s.dio, by Hobert E, 
---
Summers, is -priiiiarlly a -cciJ.lection of articles reprinted 
from various newspapers and magaz,ines, some now defunct, 
from 1941 to 1942. Summers generally upholds the necessity 
of wartime censorship as a defense against enemy propaganda. 
Published in August, 194·?., the book is limited because it 
covers only the f'.irst few months of Censorship operationsG 
Deal, has an excellent account of the relationship betwe.en 
President Roosevelt and the "Radio Priest." Tull denies the 
charge that Coughlin was a fascist, a charge the Roosevelt 
administration made when suppressing Socia~--·~L.t!~ice, 
David Kahn's The Codebreakers: The _story of Secret 
Writing, is a well-documented history of secret writing, 
codes, and cryptography. Kahn includes a short but relevant 
section on Censorship opera:tiorw durtng World War II. 
,Tames MacGregor Burns' Rooseve~!.!.-~!le S.£.~9 .. ~~r of 
FreEO .. dorn, is one of the very few works available on the last 
Roosevelt administration. Burns includes essential infor-
mation on the suppression of Social Just:lce and on ·the 
-~-
Soldiers Vote Act of 1941+, 
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Concentrating on the domestic aspects of the United 
States during World War II, Don • t You Know 1'here 's A Viar On? 
The AJ:leri9.§:!2J:!Om~ Front, 1941-1945, by Richard R. Lingeman, 
briefly reviews some of the activities of the Office of 
Censorship. The book is indispensable fol" those interested 
in the social history of the period. 
War Information and Censor_fi_hip is a small book co-
authored by Elmer :Davis and Byron Price who were, respec-
tively, the Directors of the Offices of Viar Information and 
Censorship at the time the boolc was published, A propaganda 
document, the book is interesting for its occasionally 
specious justification of the functions of the two agencies. 
The section on Censorship, written by· B~;rr.·on Price, is 
decidedly the better half'. 
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